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Abstract
The Chinese traditional manufacturing industry used to rely on raw materials and low labor
costs to achieve a competitive advantage, however, the Chinese lowest–cost labor market is no
longer competitive and the Chinese manufacturing industry is not the strongest player in the hightech area. The transition of manufacturing industry is confronted with difficulties and challenges.
From the prior research, one of the reasons over labor conflicts is the awareness of rights
consciousness. Employment dispute cases have had a significant increase since 2008, and labor
disputes gradually increased since the year 2014. Industrial actions, such as strikes and protests,
became the first and the only approach to put pressures on employers to negotiate workers’
demands. As a result, strikes have weakened companies’ profits. Distrust and antagonisms would
persist even if strikes were over.
China has increased efforts to protect workers and encourage social stability, for example,
enhancing the trade union density through a top-down administrative force. As a result, China
gained an enormous growth in trade union density and it has had a remarkable growth in the
number of collective bargaining contracts. However, the existing Chinese bargaining model and
labor laws cannot catch the status quo. Thus, the number of labor disputes has increased every
year.
The paper uses a qualitative and quantitative analysis to examine the industrial actions in
the main land of China. The results of the empirical study provide strong arguments for evaluating
the China labor disputes resolution system. In order to lessen industrial actions, the paper uses a
comparative analysis over the bargaining models and labor laws in three countries: The United
States, Germany, and the People’s Republic of China. The paper concludes with implications and
suggestions on establishing the efficient collective bargaining system in China
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I. Introduction
China has increased efforts to protect workers and mitigate industrial actions through topdown administrative actions. As a result, China has relatively high trade union density and a
remarkable improvement in the number of collective bargaining contracts. However, a large
number of the collective bargaining contracts are template contracts for lack of efficient
negotiation. Thus, the number of labor conflicts and industrial actions have increased dramatically
rather than decreased. Such growth indicates that the existing collective bargaining system cannot
provide a desirable and efficient resolution of disputes between labor and management. Industrial
actions have become the only approach to put pressure directly or indirectly on employers to
resolve workers’ demands. As industrial actions have grown, China’s administrative agency has
gained experience and has been conscious of its neutral position in the process of negotiations.
Therefore, a better understanding of the contemporary industrial actions is important in
considering the adequacy of the existing collective bargaining model. Additionally, the laws
regulating industrial actions and enhancing collective bargaining are very important to keeping
industrial peace and enhancing the functioning of the Chinese collective bargaining system.
In this thesis, I undertake a comparative analysis of the collective bargaining model in three
countries, including the United States, Germany, and the People’s Republic of China. In Chapter
2, I describe the law of collective bargaining in each of the three countries including their model
of collective bargaining, their methods for enforcing collective agreements, and their methods for
avoiding industrial conflict. In Chapter 3, I analyze datasets on seven-year industrial actions in
China, including workers’ demands, firm types, industry sectors, actions involved, and
government responses. In Chapter 4, I explore implications from the data and make suggestions
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regarding ways to improve the existing Chinese collective negotiation system. In Chapter 5, which
is the last chapter, I summarize my major findings and conclusions.

II. The Law of Collective Representation in the United States, Germany
and China
1.1 Collective Bargaining in the United States

1.1.1 The Law of Collective Bargaining in the US
Collective bargaining in the United States is conducted primarily on a single-employer
basis, with the employer and the employees’ representative determining the conditions of
employment through collective negotiations. A collective bargaining agreement is a result of
collective bargaining. In the United States, the union is the “exclusive representative” of the
employees. Labor laws, regulations, and judicial decisions control the behaviors in the process of
collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the primary federal statute
governing collective bargaining in the private sector. Under the NRLA, employees have the right
to engage in organizing campaigns, form a union, collectively bargain with their employer, and
take collective action. “Good faith” bargaining is required under the NLRA for both sides.
Employers are required to bargain with the employees’ representative in good faith about “wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”. The US Supreme Court has decided that
some managerial decisions are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining but are instead
permissive. For example, subcontracting is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, but
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the impacts of subcontracting on unit employees must bargain in good faith. 1 Collective bargaining
agreements are enforceable in federal court under federal common law. 2
1.1.2 Exclusive Representation by the Majority Representative
Unlike the other examined countries, the United States utilizes the idea of exclusive
representation. The NLRA explains that, once selected by a majority of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, the union is the exclusive representative for all workers in that unit.
Section 9 (a) of the NLRA provides that,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment.3

As for the employer, it is prohibited from bargaining on any mandatory subject of
bargaining with any other unauthorized organization or with the employees individually. The
employer can refuse to bargain with the union until the union gets majority support in an NLRB
election or bargaining order. In practice, “no union” is one of the choices on the ballot. 4 However,
once the union establishes majority support through a Board election or bargaining order, the
employer is obligated to bargain in good faith with the union on all mandatory subjects of
bargaining. 5 This system of exclusive representation is unique because it was designated by

1

NLRB v. WOOSTER DIV., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
29 U.S.C. § 185.
3
29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
4
Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquire into a “unique” American Principle, 20
COMP. LAB. L. J. 47, 54 (1998).
5
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) and § 158 (d).
2

4

majority support in a bargaining unit. In Germany, regardless of union membership, all employees
can vote, and the election is based on a proportional representation that is more accurately
manifesting employees’ choice than the election by a majority. 6
As for the employees, on the one hand, their exclusive representative represents all
employees in the bargaining unit regardless of union membership or the employees’ desire to be
represented. On the other hand, the exclusive representative must obtain majority support. That is
to say, if a representative does not meet majority support, it cannot represent any of the employees
in the unit. In International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. NLRB (Bernard-Altman)7, the
Supreme Court held that it was an unfair labor practice on both the employer and the union because
the employer unlawfully recognized an exclusive bargaining representative before it had obtained
majority support, and the union unlawfully accepted the recognition.
The traditional exclusive bargaining representative is authorized to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement for all employees in a bargaining unit, but if a union has only minority
support, there is no obligation to bargain with the union and the union can only negotiate “members
only” contracts on behalf of its members.8 If there is a minority support, the minority union can
provide their members some benefits, such as engaging in concerted collective activities and a
guideline of protections under the NLRA. 9

6

Weiss, Manfred, and Marlene Schmidt. Labour Law and Industrial Relations In Germany. 4th rev. ed. Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, at 164-66 (2008).
7
Ilgwu v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 732-40 (1961); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d
907 (1972); see more: Majestic Weaving Co., 147 NLRB 859 (1964).
8
Moshe Z. Marvit and Leigh Anne Schriever, Members-Only Unions: Can They Help Revitalize Workplace
Democracy?, The Century Foundation (Dec. 9, 2018), https://tcf.org/assets/downloads/Marvit__Schriever_Membersonly_Unions.pdf.
9
Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquire into a “unique” American Principle, 20
COMP. LAB. L. J. 47, 64 (1998).
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1.1.3 Good Faith Bargaining
1.1.3.1 The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith
The NLRA requires that parities bargain collectively in good faith. The Board will check
case by case to determine whether the parties bargained in good faith. Generally, to bargain in
good faith is an obligation to engage in negotiation actively with an open mind and a sincere desire
to reach agreement. However, there is no obligation to make any particular concessions, and parties
are allowed to seek agreement on their own terms. Good faith bargaining also requires a party to
meet the other party to bargain in a reasonable time, to make negotiation decision at table with the
authorized bargaining representative, and to be willing to reduce any agreement to writing.
Activities away from the bargaining table, referring to unilateral changes in employment of a
collective bargaining contract, may result in bad faith.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA says that,
The mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party,
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.

If an employer refuses to bargain with the bargaining representative in a unit of all
employees, the employer may be guilty of an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a)(5) of the
NLRA. The obligation to bargain in good faith ensures parties will engage in bargaining the
proposal, rather than requiring parties to reach agreement on such proposal.

6

Several requirements of bargaining in good faith are expressly set forth in the NLRA, and
then more details of the requirements are explained in common law. First, the bargaining subjects
include mandatory, permissive, and illegal. Mandatory subjects must be bargained if either party
makes a proposal regarding wages, hours, and working conditions of employment. Mandatory
subjects may be bargained to impasse. Economic strikes can be utilized over a mandatory subject
of bargaining, and the employer may replace the strikers but not terminate them. Permissive
subjects may be bargained but bargaining over these subjects is not required by law. Either party
can refuse to bargain without fear of unfair labor practice charges, which means that permissive
subjects cannot be bargained to impasse. These subjects generally have minimal impact on the
terms and working conditions of employment, but these subjects are related to general matters on
the nature and direction of the company or the internal union affairs, such as negotiation ground
rules and union dues. Sometimes, it is unclear when there is a dispute in determining mandatory
subjects or permissive subjects of bargaining. In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Division 10,
the Supreme Court concluded that “the duty is limited to mandatory subjects, such as wage, hours,
and other terms and condition of employment, within that area, neither party is obligated to yield.
As to other matters, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree.”
In Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass11, the Supreme Court indicated that mandatory subjects
are related to terms and condition of employment. Permissive subjects of bargaining cannot
constitute an unfair labor practice even though the employer provides a unilateral modification of
the existing insurance plan.

10
11

NLRB v. WOOSTER DIV., supra note 1, at 348-49.
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 163-88 (1971).
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Illegal subjects include a closed shop provision 12, hot cargo clauses, and contract terms that
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, disability, age, veteran’s status, religion, marital status, etc.
These subjects violate the law, so these subjects cannot be bargained even if both parties agreed to
do so. Unlike the subjects of collective bargaining agreements in the United States labor laws
systems, the Chinese labor laws system does not require the collective bargaining agreements to
address mandatory subjects. Also, the Chinese labor laws system does not require bargaining over
subcontracting or no strike clauses.
To determine whether the parties have negotiated in good faith, the NLRB examines the
totality of the circumstances including the parties’ statements and justifications, the proposal at the
table, bargaining history, and the willingness to make concessions. 13 The Board has pointed out
the procedural requirements on bargaining in good faith for both parties before changing or
terminating an existing contract. First, there must be recognition of the representative. Both parties
need to send an authorized representative to the bargaining table. The employer only has to
negotiate with the exclusive bargaining representative. The employer’s negotiator has different
power with three types of authority: completed authority; limited authority; and no authority. Lack
of any authority is bad faith. 14 Second, the parties must meet at reasonable times. The NLRB
examines the entirety of the circumstances, which includes the parties’ conduct both at and away
from the bargaining table, to determine whether a party utilizes delay tactics such as surface
bargaining. Surface bargaining is an unfair labor practice and a breach of obligation to bargain in
good faith under the NLRA. A busy schedule is not an excuse to continuously delay or fail to
meet.15 Third, the parties must bargain with sincere intent to reach agreement. The obligation to

12

29 U.S.C.S. § 158(b)(1)(A) and §157; see more Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
Barbara J. Fick, Negotiation Theory and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 81, 84 (1989).
14
Id. at 89-90.
15
Fern Terrace Lodge of Bowling Green, 297 NLRB 8 (1989).
13
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bargain in good faith indicates an intention and a sincere effort to reach an acceptable agreement. 16
Fourth, the parties must justify withdrawing previously accepted proposals. The Board will
consider the justification of withdrawal. Fifth, the parties must exchange information. The
employer has the obligation to provide the union with any information it reasonably needs to
perform its obligations as exclusive representative. Some of the requirements above are per se
violations. Per se violations, like refusing to negotiate, constitute bad faith. Per se violations
include unilateral changes and refusal to confer, not directly dealing with a bargaining
representative, refusal to execute a written contract, insisting to impasse on permissive subjects,
and refusal to meet at reasonable times.17
It is really important to exchange the information required by the Board and the NLRA for
the process of negotiation between labor and management. If a bargain representative and an
employer refuse to bargain in good faith about wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,
they are committing an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), and 8(b)(3).

Generally, an employer must furnish presumptively relevant information requested by a
union. The Board and the Courts set guidelines for determining the scope of disclosure of
information. First, the exchange of information needs to be requested by either party in advance,
which means the duty to furnish information does not arise without a party’s request. In NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 18 the Supreme Court held that the employer has a general duty to furnish
information that is required by a bargaining representative. In NLRB v. Boston Herald- Traveler

16

NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
American Bar Association, Management and Union's Rights and Obligations in Collective Bargaining, available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/obligations.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
18
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
17
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Corp.,19 the court held that the exchange of information does not occur until a request or demand
has been raised for certain information from the employer. In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB,20 the
court explained that without a prior exchange of requested related data such collective bargaining
is ineffective, and the party who refused to furnish the data committed an unfair labor practice
even if party rejected the request in good faith. Also, the employer cannot refuse to provide
information simply because the subject of information is ambiguous, but rather the employer
should ask for clarification from the bargaining representative. 21 The request does not need to be
in writing.22 Moreover, the request or demand by the union should be timely. The duty to exchange
information could start while the union is being elected, and the duty continues through the life of
a contract which is necessary to implement the contract and resolve conflicts. For example, the
duty to exchange information has extended to grievance arbitration. 23
Second, the information requested by a union must be presumptively relevant 24 and in good
faith. Similarly, the union has a duty to provide information requested by the employer, and if a
union fails to do so it may result in a violation of the NLRA. The Board will presume the relevant
information provided by the union is in good faith unless the employer can prove otherwise. 25 If
the requested information is outside the matters being discussed, the burden to prove relevance is
on the union side. 26 The court held that the test for the relevance of information requested by a
union is a liberal, discovery-type standard, which applies to all matters inside or outside the

19

NLRB v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 210 F.2d 134 (1954).
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (1965).
21
Azabu USA (Kona) Co., 298 NLRB 702, 134 LRRM 1245 (1990); Beth Abraham Health Services, 332 NLRB
No. 113 (2000).
22
Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671 (1989).
23
Schaeff Namco, Inc., 280 NLRB 1317, LRRM 1058 (1986); King Scoopers, Inc., 332 NLRB No. 4, 169 LRRM
1023 (2000)
24
Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
25
Columbia Univ., 298 NLRB 941, 945, 134 LRRM 1191 (1990).
26
Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 258, 258, 147 LRRM 1179 (1994).
20
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bargaining unit.27 However, if a union wants to gain access to their employer’s premises for the
purpose of securing relevant information the restrictive standard will be applied.28
The information of non-unit employees is presumptively irrelevant, 29 and not all
information related to employees in the bargaining unit collective bargaining process will be
regarded as presumptively relevant. 30 If the requested information is presumptively relevant, the
employer should provide such information even if the availability of the information is from a third
party.31 In some cases, relevant information cannot be disclosed because of confidentiality, trade
secrets, striker replacement, or other privileged information. If the relevant information is deemed
to be confidential, the employer also has a duty to figure out an alternative to satisfy both parties. 32
Moreover, if requested information is cumbersome and burdensome, the Board and the courts will
balance the burden on both parties, such as the intent of making a request or delivering the
documents.33

1.1.3.2 The Use of Mediators and Arbitrators
The use of mediation and arbitration have proven very useful in resolving labormanagement disputes. Both mediation and arbitration are handled by an impartial party mutually
selected by the employer and the union. The role of the mediator is to provide suggestions and
help both parties reach an agreement through listening to both parties’ positions and interests. The

27

NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967); NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 309, 763 F.2d
887 (8th Cir. 1985).
28
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
29
Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 241 NLRB 1016, 1018-1019 (1979), enfd. 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980).
30
Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB No. 88 (Sep. 13, 2007).
31
Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 NLRB 1369 (1985); Fireman & Oilers Local 288, 302 NLRB 1008, 1009 (1991).
32
National Steel Corporation, 332 NLRB 834 (2000); Metropolitan Edison Co., 330 NLRB 107 (1999).
33
Jeffrey I. Pasek, Charles J. Kawas, & Cozen O’Connor, The Duty to Furnish Information Under the National
Labor Relations Act, A.B.A. Labor and Employment Law CLE Conference (2007),
http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/annualconference/2007/materials/data/papers/v2/023.pdf.
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role of the arbitrator is to resolve conflicts by rendering an opinion and award through hearing
both parties’ arguments, witness testimony, and documentary evidence. Unlike mediation, the
decision of the arbitrator is a final and binding decision on both parties. Most collective bargaining
agreements contain a specific arbitration clause. In a rare situation, the arbitration adjudication is
not final and binding if both parties consent and manifest their specific intent beforehand that the
arbitration award is not binding. 34 Courts only review an arbitration decision to check whether the
arbitrator is fair, and the decision is invalidated only in extremely rare circumstances such as fraud
or undue influence. 35
The advantage and disadvantage of arbitration has been discussed for decades. There are
two types of arbitration in the United States: labor arbitration and employment arbitration. Labor
arbitration is a method of settling disputes based on collective bargaining agreements. Employment
arbitration is a method of solving contractual and statutory claims from individual employment
contracts, pre-dispute agreements or post-dispute agreements, and non-union policies.36 The courts
have expanded the scope of employment arbitration and narrowed the ability of individual
employees to avoid an arbitration and obtain a judicial review in a dispute. 37

For the labor arbitrations, there are two types: interest arbitration and rights arbitration.
Interest arbitration is used to solve disputes arising from future terms and conditions in order to
reach a new collective bargaining agreement. According to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation

34

FreeAdvice staff, Are there appeals in arbitration?, FreeAdvice Legal,
https://law.freeadvice.com/litigation/appeals/arbitration_appeals.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2018)
35
Id.
36
What is the difference between ‘labor’ and ‘employment’ arbitration , Arbitration Info,
http://law.missouri.edu/arbitrationinfo/2015/08/20/what-is-the-difference-between-labor-and-employmentarbitration-2/ (last visited Dec.9, 2018).
37
Stone, Katherine VW, and Alexander JS Colvin. "The arbitration epidemic: Mandatory arbitration deprives
workers and consumers of their rights." Economic Policy Institute, Dec7, at 4 (2015).
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Service (FMCS), the 2013 fiscal year data report showed there was only 1.5% interest arbitration
among total caseloads. This is because interest arbitration is infrequently used in reality and some
states have their own state public sector labor relations agency to handle an interest arbitration. 38
Rights arbitration is used to resolve the dispute related to the implementation and interpretation of
an existing collective bargaining contract. Most collective bargaining contracts contain a right
arbitration process for after the grievance procedure, and the arbitration process only focuses on
the unsolved disputes in the grievance procedure. 39

1.1.4 Enforcing the Collective Bargaining Agreement
1.1.4.1 Use and Deference to Arbitration
Section 203 (d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 declares that
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of
such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional
cases.40

Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 says that
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor

38

The Art & Science of Labor Arbitration (study guide to accompany DVD from the College of Labor and
Employment Lawyers, 2014) (with B. Dobranski, I.B. Helburn & J. Parker),
https://www.laborandemploymentcollege.org/pdfs/AME%20Col%20Study%20Guide%20for%20Art%20Science%
20of%20Labor%20Arbitration.pdf, at 23-24.
39
Id.
40
29 U.S. Code § 173 (d).
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organization, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.41

The Supreme Court explained Section 301(a) in the Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills (1957)
case, which ended the confusion and uncertainty of Section 301(a). The Supreme Court held that
the collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause was specifically enforceable. Also,
Congress was eager to promote collective bargaining agreements that ended with an arbitration
clause and a no strike clause in order to encourage industrial peace. 42
In 1960, the deference to labor arbitration was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the famous
“Steelworkers Trilogy” cases. The Supreme Court upheld that: 1) labor arbitration should be
ordered when the parties agreed to submit all grievances to the arbitration, and the courts actually
have no business considering the merits of the grievance; 43 2) labor arbitration clauses should be
explained in a broad way, and the arbitration should be ordered unless there is a positive assurance
of non-intention to arbitrate on the asserted dispute;44 and 3) the enforcement of an arbitration
award should be affirmed by the court if the arbitrator’s award is legitimate only as it “draws its
essence” from the collective bargaining contract. 45 These three cases confirmed the significant role
of labor arbitration as a preferred resolution. As a result, arbitration cases have increasingly been
used to resolve labor-management disputes.

41

29 U.S. Code § 185 (a) and (b).
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-54 (1957).
43
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564-69 (1960).
44
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
45
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
42
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Further, there are four noted cases that support the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration
clause with a waiver in individual employment contracts. First, in the Gardner-Denver case, the
Supreme Court held that an employee’s statutory right to sue in court under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is not prevented by the prior submission to final arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement with a nondiscrimination clause.46 The Gardner-Denver case indicated the
issue of discrimination was addressed in the collective bargaining agreement, and the arbitration
based on the collective bargaining contract cannot preclude an individual’s right to pursue the
judicial resolution of his statutory claim. However, the Gilmer case was about the enforcement of
an individual employment agreement to arbitrate statutory claims under the FAA. 47 In the Gilmer
case (1991), the Supreme Court indicated that Gilmer should resolve his ADEA claim following
the arbitration clause unless he can show the conflict between arbitration and ADEA’s purposes.
Second, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. (1998), the Supreme Court held
that the collective bargaining agreement with a general arbitration clause cannot demand Wright
to use the arbitration procedure without a clear and unmistakable waiver of employees' statutory
rights to a federal forum. 48 The Gilmer case is different than the Wright case because Gilmer
involved a waiver of rights in the individual contract. The Wright case, however, did not have a
waiver that matched the “clear and unmistakable standard,” and the waiver prevented Wright from
suing in the federal court. Also, Wright raised another unsolved question on whether or not the
union representative can make a clearly and unmistakably union-negotiated collective bargaining
agreement to wave employees’ rights to a judicial forum of employment discrimination claims. 49

46

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-60 (1947).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
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As a result, the mandatory arbitration with a class action waiver clauses have increased since the
year 1980.
Third, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett (2009)50, the U.S. Supreme Court held that unions may
waive their members’ rights to pursue antidiscrimination claims in court by agreeing to a
mandatory arbitration clause. The holding rejected many of the rationales that had governed the
Court in the Gardner-Denver case. Fourth, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018), the Supreme
Court held that arbitration agreements providing for individual proceedings, and waiving class or
collective actions, are lawful and enforceable. 51 The court emphasized that Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (1953) only mentions the concerted activities to organize a
union and bargain collectively, rather than rules on how to regulate adjudication of class or
collective actions in court or arbitration. 52
As distinct from labor arbitration, employment arbitration is a resolution of employment
strife between an employer and individual employee, which normally is of less concern of the
employment relationship. It is of less concern because an individual employee was discharged at
that time or the employee resigned as a result of the employer created hostile working environment,
and after that neither party wants to rebuilt the relationship. 53 As the paper mentioned before, the
term arbitration has been used broadly because the courts have expanded the utility of arbitration.
Moreover, not only in labor arbitration cases but in employment arbitration cases, the Courts have
supported mandatory arbitration. 54 The Supreme Court has clearly established that an individual
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employment arbitration agreement with the class/collective actions waiver is lawful and
enforceable.55
1.1.4.2 The Enforcement of No Strike Clauses
In the collective bargaining agreement, explicit no-strike clauses generally prohibit strikes
during the life of the contract, and a no-strike clause may be implied when a contract contains a
broad mandatory arbitration clause. The Supreme Court has held that a no-strike clause is the quid
pro quo of a broad mandatory arbitration clause, and the injunction of strikes would be supported
where the employees have the contractual right to arbitrate the dispute.56
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 restricted the use of court injunction in labor disputes
against strikes, picketing, and boycotts. Labor organizations have enhanced their strength and
power since the year of 1935, the Congress’s attitude towards labor disputes had changed from
protecting labor movement to encouraging the collective bargaining and peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes. 57 In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act). Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act has authorized that federal
courts have jurisdiction where a breach of contract has happened between an employer and a union
organization. A breach of contract gives the district courts of the United States jurisdiction of
parties without considering the parties’ citizenship or the amount in controversy. 58
In Boys Markets, 59 the Supreme Court held that there are three tests for an anti-strike
injunction. The first one is the “over an arbitrable grievance” test, which indicates the strike must
be over a broad mandatory arbitration clause implying a no-strike obligation that both parties
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contractually bound to arbitrate. Second, either the employer or the union must be ordered to
arbitrate. Third, the moving party must satisfy traditional equity requirements in requiring the
injunction.60 The Boys Markets case revived the decision of anti-injunction in the Sinclair case
that federal courts precluded from issuing injunction against strike under a contract with no-strike
clause.61 However, the Supreme Court limited that Boys Markets exception and refused to expand
every strike in breach of a collective bargaining contract. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, the Supreme Court held that the district court was not empowered to enjoin the
sympathy strike by issuing an injunction when the primary strike is not subject to the binding
arbitration clause. 62 Further, the Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW Local 1759 held that an injunction is
appropriate when the object and potential effect of a sympathy strike are to compel the primary
strikers’ employer to concede an arbitrable issue. From the two important cases above we see that
primary strikes may be enjoined if the underlying disputes are subject to a mandatory arbitration
clause, but sympathy strikes may not be enjoined if the dispute underlying the primary strike is not
subject to mandatory arbitration. However, a sympathy strike may be enjoined if it exerted pressure
on the employer to concede an arbitrable issue, and if it prevented the employer from the
contractually mandated arbitration procedure. 63
1.1.5 Methods of Promoting Industrial Peace
The concept of "promoting industrial peace" can be understood as a method to prohibit
costly strategic behavior as well as to promote cooperative relations between the labor and
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management. 64 Inconsistent with the “robber baron,” a “captain of industry” was a group of
business leaders who focused on encouraging productivity and committed into industrial peace by
the constraints of collective bargaining.65 Congress has enacted various labor statutes to promote
industrial peace. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 indicated federal courts cannot flatly issue an
injunction against a series of labor actions. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner
Act) inclined to protect unionism and collective bargaining. Lastly, the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act) shifted its purpose from protecting unionism to a
more neutral position.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has set up various tests to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement. As the paper mentioned above, for example, there are two tests to determine whether
the court will issue an injunction against a strike or a sympathy strike: the "over an arbitrable
grievance" test in Boys Markets case and the “object of the strike" test in Cedar Coal case. A
grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement is fully enforced on both parties, and
a no-strike clause is guaranteed the enforcement of collective contract.
Historically, the American working class enjoys individualism rather than collectivism
based on the social context. 66 On the other hand, American managers are reluctant to tolerate
unionism and use strategies to avoid the organization of their employees. 67 Additionally,
government prosecution of radical unionism suppressed labor protests and affected the evolution
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of the American labor movement. 68 Because the labor movement was more likely to succeed with
modest demands concerning the conditions of employment rather than more radical political
activities to change the capitalist system, the demands of the American labor movement have
focused on “bread and butter” issues such as increasing wages and improving working
conditions.69 The number of strikes was also affected by foreign trade and the declining prospects
of American workers. The workers were afraid of having their work sent overseas. According to
the figure below,70 the number of strikes and lockouts have been dramatically decreased since the
year 1982 because of the above methods and reasons together resulted in declining of work
stoppages.
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1.2 The Law of Collective Bargaining in Germany

1.2.1 The Model of Collective Bargaining
The Germany industrial relation system is based on the “dual system of interest
representation.” Therefore, collective labor disputes can be settled in one of two ways. First, the
disputes can be settled by trade unions and the employer organizations or employers through
collective agreements at a sector-level or a company level. Second, the disputes can be settled by
workers’ representation institutions and employers through works agreements at the establishment
level. The collective bargaining is governed by the Collective Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz)
of 1949. The Act indicates that the trade union and the employer (either employer organizations
or individual employers) have rights to conclude a collective bargaining agreement. The dominant
bargaining model is multi-employer bargaining model at the sector level between a trade union
and employer organizations.
After World War II, Germany adopted a constitutional strict separation that required
collective bargaining to take place without the State directly exerting influence. 71 Then, after 2003,
Laws for Reform of the Job Market (the Hartz reforms) were enacted to create employment
opportunities, set additional wage subsidies, reform the Federal Employment Agency, and reduce
unemployment benefits. 72 Together with these reforms, the continuous decentralization of
collective bargaining occurred as a result of the coverage of sector collective bargaining
agreements moderately dropping while the coverage of company level collective bargaining
agreements and works agreements have increased.
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The workers’ representation by a works council is the basic set-up based on the Works
Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, BetrVG), which was amended in 2001. A Works
Council can be voted on by all employees regardless of whether or not they are union members,
and the works council can be created in all establishments where there are more than five
employees. Additionally, another type of the works councils, called workers’ representation in
supervisory boards, occurs in the companies that employ more than 2,000 employees on a regular
basis according to the Co‐Determination Act of 1976. The role of a work council includes codetermination, information and consultation. However, the work council does not have a right to
bargain on issues in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, unless the collective
agreement explicitly allows it. 73 Also, the work council has no right to strike. 74 A works agreement
(Betriebsvereinbarungen) is created by the employer and the works council, and it covers only
employees in an establishment. Such agreements regulate all matters in an establishment, such as
internal company rules, but the agreements cannot include the context of bargaining issues unless
the collective agreement allowed it to do so.
Besides the works agreements, there are two types of collective agreements: a collective
agreement (Tarifverträge) between a trade union and an employer association and a collective
agreement (Volkswagen) between a trade union and an individual employer. 75 The collective
agreement has priority over an individual employment agreement unless the collective agreement
allows deviations in a specific context or unless the implementation of the employment agreement
is more favorable for employees. According to Section 77(3) of the Works Council Constitution
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Act, the principle of favorability 76 does not apply to the cases over the relationship between
collective contracts and works agreements because the collective contract cannot be a subject
matter of a works agreement. However, if the collective agreement has an opening clause that
allows the works agreement to amend or modify working conditions related to the clauses within
the works agreement, the principle of favorability applies in such case.77
Since, the coverage of collective bargaining has continued to decline in both western and
eastern Germany. 78 In order to make collective agreements more flexible, the social partners have
agreed to allow an opening clause in a collective agreement to deviate from the collective standards
at sector level to company level. 79
Moreover, the number of union membership has declined but employer organizations have
enhanced their power with opt-out clauses.80 In order to mitigate the trend of decentralization and
fragmentation, 81 there were two key reformations. On the one hand, ‘crisis corporatism’ was
adopted during the Great Recession of 2008, and on the other hand, legal reforms strengthened
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collective bargaining autonomy by the extension of collective agreements. Also, and the statutory
minimum wage was set.
The extension of collective agreement was rarely used in Germany because the extension
made impacts on mitigating wage inequality but it also reduced employment. 82 Collective
agreements can be extended under the Collective Agreements Act. Under the Collective
Agreements Act, the federal and/or the regional labor ministers may extend an agreement if social
partners’ bipartite wage committee approved the extension and if the agreement covered at least
50% of employees in a sector. 83 The extensions of collective agreements are rarely used; thus, the
collective bargaining coverage has dropped even lower than other widespread used EU member
countries over the 2000s.84 The prerequisite for an extension has changed; nowadays the extension
is of public interest. The Posted Workers Act aimed on setting minimum standards for working
conditions in certain sectors, such as construction industry, cleaning services, letter delivery
services, etc.85 Under the Posted Workers Act, the federal labor minister may extend an agreement
at the sector-level to national-level if the extension is of public interest. 86 That is to say, under this
law, an extension of sectoral collective agreement can be extended in any industry rather than
specific industries if the extension is served as public interest. 87 In 2014, the Act to Strengthen the
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Autonomy of Collective Bargaining (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz) was enforced to promote
collective bargaining, to encourage the role of state in wage setting, and to require setting the
minimum wage starting on January 2015. If wages have been set by sector-level collective
agreements that are less than the minimum wage, the wage will be valid until January 2017. 88
1.2.2 Tripartite Bargaining
As a result of the Great Recession of 2008, western European countries had suffered Gross
domestic product (GDP) declines and significant impacts on the realm of labor market. The
combination of the financial crisis, company closures and increasing unemployment rate,
restructuring, and the economy shift from manufacturing toward services explain the declined
coverage of collective agreements.89 In order to respond to the trend, various tripartite bargaining
happened at the national inter-sector level, the sector level, the regional level, and mostly at the
company level.90
Tripartite bargaining models involved governments, employers/employers’ organization,
and trade unions. Sometimes, the role of government is as a partner directly involved in reaching
agreements, or more frequently, the role is making public policies that indirectly involve and
influence the context of agreements. 91 For example, the national government was aimed to make
public policies on short-term working projects, unemployment benefits, labor market schemes,
legislation, and much more during the crisis. 92 There are three models of tripartite bargaining:
institutionalized tripartism, flexible combination of bipartism and tripartism, and pragmatic and
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occasional tripartism. 93 Namely, the institutionalized tripartism existed in some west European
countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland. There they have permanent tripartite
institutions that provide a framework for consultations and agreements, and they also provides
guidelines and regulations for collective bargaining. 94 The flexible combination of bipartism and
tripartism existed in other countries, such as France and Spain. There they have a two-stage system
to reach collective agreements: first, the negotiation of inter-sectoral collective agreements; second,
the dialogue with the government authorities confirmed by a signature joint document. 95
Different than the first and second model, the last model - pragmatic and occasional
tripartism – was in other countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom. They have neither
set up official tripartite dialogue bodies nor adopted explicit tripartite agreements. 96 As for
Germany, tripartite dialogue has been tried several times during the crisis, but failed in the end. 97
Instead of utilizing tripartite dialogues or formal tripartite agreements, the flexible use of collective
bargaining and comprehensive labor market reforms were applied to reach collective agreements
or state-sponsored collective agreements. 98 In late 2008, the employers’ association Gesamtmetal
and IG Metall (Baden-Württemberg) reached a sector pay agreement on a step-wise increase of
wages and lump-sum payment without pay increase as compensation. 99
The apprenticeship pact (Ausbildungspakt) was concluded between the employers and the
government in 2004 and renewed in 2007; however, the pact was hard to be followed by the
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employers to reach an agreement in 2009. 100 Therefore, the partial unemployment/short-time
working (Kurzarbeit) was created. The Kurzarbeit, as a statutory short-time working scheme, is a
significant example of informal tripartism that supports temporary economic difficulty companies
on reducing working hours and wages. 101 The union membership has been declining, especially
after the early 2004, because the Pforzheim Accord established a permission that allowed
companies and workers to make special agreements at the company or plant level. 102 Yet, the
number of jobs during the crisis declined even more than the union membership; therefore, the
union representative was broadly used in larger sized manufacture companies. 103 “Tripartite”
agreements can be made at the sector level; for example, the employers’ organization
Gesamtmetall and trade union IG Metall reached a sectoral agreement on the implementation of
short-time working in metal companies. Additionally, government subsidies were paid to the
employers to keep extended short-time working attractive. 104 But mostly, the tripartite agreement
was made at company level; for example, in order to get government funds to save the business,
Schaeffler sought “crisis cooperation” with metalworkers’ union IG Metall. 105 Finally, they made
a company level agreement on job security 106 concluded by the Workers’ representation
supervisory boards (Aufsichtsräte) with the right of co‐determination. In other cases, the agreement
can be concluded by the Works Council. 107 Also, in other cases, the opening clauses within
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collective agreements were used to give the works council the right to reach the new agreements
to cut costs and improve companies’ competitiveness.108
At the end of 2014, a new alliance for vocational and further training was announced by
the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) which ended the Pact on Apprenticeship. The
new alliance is aimed at stimulating the number of apprenticeship positions, enhancing advanced
training system, and encouraging young people to take up apprenticeships. 109
The Minimum Wage Act (Mindestlohngesetz, MiLoG) was enacted in 2015. The minimum
wage rate was finally set by the government considering non-binding recommendations from the
expert committee and a mechanism (i.e. indexation); however, social partners were not directly
involved in determining the national minimum wage. 110 The expert committee aimed to reach
consensus on the level of the minimum wage, and then provided recommendations to the
government.111 The people in an expert committee should represent the general interests of the
country and should have full consultation with the related social partners. 112 The self-employed
and low-wage foreign workers were widespread because of the globalization and the mobility of
the labor market. As a result of increased foreign workers, wage dumping (Lohndumping), as well
as social dumping, created a negative influence on native labor standards determined for the
collective agreements. In response to this trend, in 2018, the specific rates 113 of national minimum
wage were abolished. However, there is one exception – seasonal workers and foreign workers in
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the seasonal contracts. These workers may deduct board and lodging costs from the minimum
wage.114 On the other hand, if the minimum wage of the collective agreement is less than the
statutory minimum wage, the statutory minimum wage will apply. 115 Apart from the minimum
wage-setting, the government never made any institutional changes in the wage-setting process.
The wage-setting process is based on collective negotiation without direct influence from the
government, which is guaranteed by the Germany Constitution. 116
1.2.3 National Pattern Bargaining
National pattern bargaining rarely exist in Germany. In private sector, an extension of a
collective agreement may be issued in terms of public interest, but the employment in the area
cannot fall below the generally prevailing level. In addition, the extension is only issued if at least
one party makes an application and if the extension involves the employers on whom the collective
bargaining agreement is already binding at least 50% of all employees within its occupational
scope of application. Moreover, the government is not authorized to change any content of the
agreement, and the government cannot go against the will of both parties. 117 As a result of union
wage premiums, employers hired non-union members that they can pay below collective
bargaining wages during the economic crisis during the Weimar era. Therefore, Section 5 of the
1949 Collective Agreements Act (TVG) states that there is a possibility to extend a sector-level
collective bargaining contract to non-organized social partners within the region and industry
covered by the corresponding collective agreement. The imposing extension order is issued by the
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Federal or Land Minister of Labor and Social Affairs upon the application from either or both
parties, and the order requires consent from a committee with three representatives respectively
from the umbrella associations of both sides. 118
The Posting Workers Act (1996) allows the federal labor minister to extend a sector
collective bargaining agreement to a national level in terms of social partners’ plea, and the sector
collective bargaining agreement can be extended if the sectoral agreement has covered more than
half of the employees and it is for the public interest. 119 The extension of a collective bargaining
can also be issued by government decree since the year of 1999, which does not request the consent
from a committee of representatives. This is allowed because the committee’s consent is hard to
achieve in the construction sector regarding the applicability of minimum wage to posted
workers.120
1.2.4 Enforcing Collective Agreements
Germany’s Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) holds that if there is a conflict
among several collective agreements in an operation, the collective agreement created by the trade
union with a majority support will apply in the operation. The Act on Collective Bargaining Unity
(Tarifeinheitsgesetz) was enacted in 2015. The Act allows court proceedings to determine the
majority union representation in an operation, which reestablishes the principle of Unitarian
Bargaining (Tarifeinheit). 121 As for minority unions, on the one hand, the Act does not prohibit
small trade unions’ right to strike. On the other hand, small trade unions’ collective agreements
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may be rejected only if a collective agreement has adequately considered the minority union
members’ interests, which is determined by a trade union with majority support. 122 Germany is
different from the United States because there is no mandatory arbitration clause in the collective
agreements. However, Germany is similar to the United States because Germany has a peace
clause while the United States has a no-strike clause.
The peace clause can be extended after the termination of the contract to prevent industrial
actions. Since Germany has both sector and establishment levels of collective bargaining, a big
trade union is needed to create a sector-level collective agreement with employers’ associations. 123
Under those situations, the collective dispute resolution is not used to prevent strikes. However,
since the creation of the sector-level collective agreements and the start of the company-level
bargaining, the peace clause can be used to prevent strikes. 124
1.2.5 Methods for Avoiding Strikes
In Germany, Art. 9(3), of the Basic Law of the Federal Constitutional Court, gives workers
the right to industrial actions. 125 However, only trade unions with capacity to bargain collectively
can call strikes, and the strike cannot be called if there is a peace clause in the collective agreement
that is currently in effect or for a period afterwards. The Federal Labor Court applied the principle
of proportionality to determine the use of industrial actions that will comply with the peace clause.
For instance, a strike must be fair and the last resort. In addition, the strike must be preceded by a
secret ballot of union members. 126 Similar to the United States, wildcat strikes are illegal and
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forbidden.127 Sympathy strikes, however, may be allowed under the trade unions’ control in certain
situations.128
Another type of industrial action is the flash mob. The Constitution Court held that a flash
mob was not against the Constitution. 129 During the negotiation process, the trade union can call a
flash mob, or a token strike. 130 The Federal Labor Court held that, for a trade union, the
permissibility of a flash mob must be recognized as a dispute method. The Federal Labor Court
also held that, for an employer, the sufficient reaction against a flash mob is temporary business
closure under the right of domestic ownership. 131 The labor disputes over business decisions have
yet to be discussed in the courts. The main viewpoint of the court is that strikes are legal because
if there is a demand that will make an impact on a business decision, the legality of strikes remain
unchallenged and the relocation of the enterprise would be just a consequence of a collective
autonomy without triggering any legal consequence. 132
Generally, the Federal Labor Court is more flexible with regard to industrial actions as
compared to the United States court system. In Germany, the strike aimed to achieve settlement of
a collective labor disputes, which must be linked to a collective contract and must be initiated by
a trade union.133 The right to strike is prohibited in three ways. First, strikes must not infringe on
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other citizens’ fundamental rights or damage the public interest. 134 Second, if there is a peace
obligation explicitly or implicitly in the context of a collective agreement, both parties are required
to follow the obligation related to the subject matters of the collective agreement. 135 After the
termination of a collective agreement, there is no longer a peace obligation, unless the parties
agree on a continuing peace obligation to have more time for negotiations without the threat of a
strike.136 Third, a strike should be used after all other methods have failed; a strike should be used
as the last resort. A strike should respect the principle of proportionality. 137 A trade union, instead
of the court, should decide whether all other means failed before a strike was called. 138
Other than limiting the right to strike, codetermination is another way to avoid industrial
actions. There are two levels of the right to codetermination: 1) codetermination through the works
council (Betriebsrat) at the establishment level and 2) codetermination through the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat) at the company and group level. As for the works council, the right of
codetermination is regulated by the Works Constitution Act (1972). As for the supervisory board,
the right of codetermination is regulated by the Co-Determination Acts 139 and Third Part Act of
2004 (former Works Constitution Act (1952)). 140
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The system of the works council resolved many labor disputes without inducing industrial
actions. The system also guaranteed workers’ participation in the regulation of working conditions,
and the system guaranteed workers input into management prerogatives.

141

The works councilors are selected from employees in a workplace. All employees,
including part-time workers and interns, who are older than eighteen and have served at least six
months, have the right to vote on the works councilors. 142 The employees who are allowed to vote
do not include managerial employees and independent contractors.143 If the employees were sent
to another employer until the end of some work , those employees are eligible to vote if they are
working more than three months in the firm. 144 If an employer interferes with the establishment of
the works council, the employer can be subject to criminal fines or the maximum of one year
imprisonment.145
Work council members can be selected if there are more than five employees in an
establishment;146 in large workplaces, the works council can exist together with trade unions. A
work agreement, which is made by a works council and an establishment, may contain work rules,
working hours, the methods of payment, accident prevention, health protection, structure and
administration of fringe benefits, the introduction to technical devices for monitoring employees'
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performance, and any other issues related to the employees’ place of work. 147 According to the
compulsory conciliation proceeding of the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG), when it is difficult
to create a works agreement, the conciliation board can settle any disputes. 148 The conciliation
board consists of a labor judge (as an independent chairman) and an equal number of
representatives from the employer and the works council. 149 The final decision of the conciliation
board is binding unless the board goes against general principles and exceeds its discretion under
the laws.150
The works council can require companies to comply with a works agreement enforced by
the decision of an establishment-level arbitration committee; however, the establishment-level
arbitration committee will recognize the priority of a collective agreement over a works agreement
related to the same collective matters. The collective agreement takes priority regardless of
whether or not the establishment is bound by the collective agreement. 151 The Federal Labor Court
held that the trade union can stop the establishment from implementing the works agreement if the
works agreement is not in compliance with the provisions of the collective agreement at the
establishment level.152
In practice, many establishments are covered by a collective agreement, or they are
governed by the works council with a collective agreement as a guide. The works councilors have
a majority in a collective bargaining committee. The interactions between trade unions and works
councils are as follow: first, the works councilors influence the workers’ attitudes on the right to
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strike at the company level, which then also influences trade union policy; 153 second, trade unions
can represent the works council in labor courts if at least one work councilor is also a trade union
member;154 third, trade unions have indirect impacts on the works council when more than 25%
of the works councilors permit trade union officials to participate in the works council meeting;155
last, the works council and the trade union worked together to mitigate conflicts over wage
demands for years before and after the crisis. 156
As opposed to the work councilors, the supervisory board guarantees the workers’ right to
participate in company-wide questions related to economic planning and decision making. Also,
the board gives workers the right of codetermination that only exists in large companies. 157 The
supervisory board members were selected by employee representatives and shareholder
representatives. According to the One-third-participation Act (DrittelbG), if there are more than
five hundred, but less than two thousand, regular employees in a stock corporation (“AG”), the
company should have a supervisory board with one third of the seats filled by the employees’
representatives in the company. Then, if there are more than two thousand regular employees in a
stock corporations (“AG”) or more than five hundred in a limited liability corporation (“GmbH”),
the company should have a supervisory board with one half of the seats filled by the employees’
representatives.158

1.3 The Law on Employee Representation and Strikes in China
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1.3.1 The model of collective bargaining

Unlike the German dual system of representation and the American exclusive bargaining
unit, the Chinese Collective bargaining model is a combination of bipartite and tripartite
bargaining and typically there is a two-stage system to reach collective agreements: first, the
negotiation of company/sectoral level collective agreements; second, the labor administrative
agency shall review and confirm the collective contract in a signed document with its opinions.
Mostly, Chinese workers are represented by a grassroots trade union at the company level.
According to the Provisions of Collective Contracts, either a grassroots trade union (at least fifty
percent employees) or an employer can make a written request of collective bargaining, the nonmoving party shall not refuse collective bargaining unless there are reasonable and justifiable
reasons to do so. The Trade Unions Law requires that firms with more than twenty-five employees
shall establish grassroots trade union committee, and a firm with less than twenty-five employees
can establish a grassroots trade union committee individually or the firm can join with another firm
to establish the grassroots trade union committee. The Employment Contract Law prohibits
individual employment contracts from making working conditions and remuneration lower than
the standards written in the collective agreement.

There are three levels of collective bargaining: company, regional, and sectoral. The
Employment Contract Law allows collective agreements at the regional or sectoral level, and the
agreements can be reached by trade unions and employees’ representatives in certain industries,
such as construction, mining, and foodservice industry. These agreements, however, only exist
within the areas below the county level of administrative region in terms of the laws. The
Employment Contract Law clarifies that collective agreements at regional/sectoral level would be
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binding on all firms and employees within their region/sector, and collective agreements at the
company level would be binding on all employees and the employer.

As for a collective agreement at the company level, the collective agreement draft was
made by the grassroots trade union and the employer. After that, the collective agreement shall be
discussed with the Employee Representative Congress/employees in a meeting that at least two
thirds of employee representatives/employees participated. The final draft of collective agreement
shall get consent from half of the employee representatives/employees in the meeting, and then it
shall be signed by both parties. The final draft shall be reviewed by the local Labor and Social
Security Administrative agency within fifteen days with regard to three aspects: parties’
competency, legitimate bargaining procedures, and legality of the agreements’ contents. Once the
agreement is approved through the legality check, it would take effect. As for a sectoral/regional
collective agreement, the draft of the agreement made by the trade union and the employers’
associations shall be reviewed and checked for legality by the local Labor and Social Security
Administrative Agency within fifteen days. If the agreement does not receive opposition from the
administrative agency, it would come into force.

According to the Provisions of Collective Contracts, if there is an interest dispute in the
process of reaching collective agreements, either party or both parties can request the local Labor
and Social Security Administrative Agency to intervene. Then, the local Labor and Social Security
Administrative Agency will organize the trade union/employees’ representatives and the
employer’s representative to sit before a bargaining table and hold a bipartite bargaining session
under the supervision of the local Labor and Social Security Administrative Agency. The provision
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indicates that the contemporary labor disputes conditions, and industrial actions are used to obtain
opportunities to bargain with employers rather than the last resort of labor disputes.

As for rights disputes in the process of implementation of collective agreements, either
party can apply request labor arbitration through the Labor Disputes Arbitration Committee. The
grassroots trade union also can provide support to employees based on the China Trade Union Law
(2001). Therefore, the grassroots trade union can either participate in the triparty bargaining, or
labor arbitration, as well as offer assistance to employees’ representatives in arbitration and
litigation. Before collective labor disputes go to the labor arbitration committee, or the tripartite
bargaining mechanism, the collective labor disputes may be solved by internal resolutions in the
Conciliation Committee. According to the Labor Disputes Conciliation and Arbitration Law (中
华人民共和国劳动争议调解仲裁法(2007)), the Conciliation Committee shall be established in
an enterprise if a grassroots trade union council and the Employee Representatives Congress were
established in the enterprise. The Conciliation Committee is made up of the employer
representative and the employees’ representatives selected from the trade union. The Conciliation
Committee can either decide individual employment disputes or decide collective labor disputes
that relate to collective agreements or working conditions without collective agreements. Table 1
below lists the approaches in the three countries with regard to resolving interest and rights
disputes between labor and management in the private sector.

Interest
Dispute

TABLE 1: Labor Disputes Resolutions (private sector)
USA
Germany
China
1. Collective bargaining 1. “Dual System”
1. Conciliation inside
(at plant level)
companies through the
Collective agreements (sector Labor Conciliation
2. Economic weapons
level/company level):
Committees (not all
(i.e. strikes and lockout) Pragmatic and Occasional
companies have such
Tripartite Bargaining:
committees)
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3. Interest arbitration is
reserved primarily to
public sector employees
who do not have the
right to strikes. The
Employee Free Choice
Act has been debated
over how interest
arbitration would
translate to the private
sector. 159

government participation
with policies but not
bargaining
Works agreements
(establishment level)
2. Industrial actions (i.e.
strikes)

2. Strikes (led by
employees/other
organizations except
trade unions)
3. Negotiation between
the employer and the
workers’
representative/grassroots
union
4. A written request to
mediate and settle the
interest dispute at the
local Labor and Social
Security Administrative
Agency, and then, renegotiation under the
guide of the local Labor
and Social Security
Administrative Agency
(Tripartite bargaining
(government
participated)

Right
1. Grievance procedures
Disputes
• arbitration
clauses
• non-strike
clauses
2. Rights Arbitration
(mandatory based on
collective agreements)
• if issues are
arbitral, the issue
can be solved in
arbitration.
• if issues are nonarbitral, the issue
must be brought
to a federal court

1. The peace clause: no
strikes
2. Arbitration (not
mandatory)
• An arbitration
agreement between
unions and employers
are valid, and
governed by the
German Labor Court
Law
(Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz
(ArbGG)).
• Arbitration
agreements in

1. Conciliation inside
companies (the Labor
Conciliation
Committees)
2. Negotiation (in
format collective
contracts)
3. Labor Arbitration in
the Labor Arbitration
Committees (statutory
and mandatory)
• Conciliation
• Labor
arbitration: If
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for judicial
determination
3. The Federal Courts 160
The courts are more
likely to act in such
cases where there
are due process
concerns than they
are when the issue is
simply the
“correctness” of the
arbitrator’s award.
Or it is contrary to
“well defined”
public policy.

contracts between an
employer and an
employee are invalid.
2. The German Labor Courts
Pro-arbitration

either party was
not satisfied with
the award, they
could sue in a
People’s Court.
4. The People’s Courts

Generally, trade unions can be workers’ representatives in collective bargaining and labor
arbitration in light of the Chinese labor and employment laws. Besides recourse to trade unions,
there is another system to address employee interests– the Employee Representatives Congress,
which regulates the format of enterprises democratic management. In the Employee
Representatives Congress system, the grassroots trade union shall be responsible for checking the
Employee Representatives Congress’ routine work and supervising the implementation of the
Employee Representatives Congress’ decisions. The Provision on Enterprises Democratic
Management (企业民主管理规定(2012)) explains that the Employee Representative Congress
system applies to all enterprises including private enterprises and FIEs, SOEs, stock corporations,
and collective enterprises. As for a medium/small enterprise within the areas below the county
level of the administrative region, the enterprise does not need to set up the Employees
Representatives Congress individually, however, it can set up an Employees Congress on a
sectoral/regional basis together with other medium/small enterprises in such areas.
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The Provision on Enterprises Democratic Management explains that the Congresses’
representatives consist of workers (including leased workers and migrant workers), technical staff,
managers and supervisors, and other employees. Among the Congress’s representatives, the
managers and supervisors cannot exceed twenty percent of the total number of representatives.
The Employee Representative Congress’s duties include: 1) providing advice and comments for
the enterprises’ development plans, the management plans, and the bylaws; 2) examining and
approving the company bylaws/plans on working conditions directly affecting employees’
interests; 3) examining and approving collective agreements drafts; 4) supervising the enterprises
implement of labor laws and regulations; 5) voting to select candidates in the Employees
Board/Employees Supervisory Board ( 职 工 董 事 和 职 工 监 事 ), after the trade unions
recommended candidates. As opposed to the formation of the Employee Representatives Congress,
the Employees Board/Employees Supervisory Board only consists of employee representatives
and it only existed in the stock corporations. Moreover, the Board members have rights to represent
employees taking part in stock corporations’ decision-making and to participate in supervision.
Based on the changing economy, public policies may change general duties of the Employees
Representatives Congress. For example, the State Council announced opinions on overcapacity of
coal and steel industries in 2016. The opinions emphasized that the employee settlement plan
should get an approval from the Employee Representatives Congress, or the company cannot
implement the plan. 161

Within the stock corporations, the Chinese Employees Board/Employees Supervisory
Board, which only consists of employee representatives, seems to give employees more rights to

国务院关于煤炭行业化解过剩产能实现脱困发展的意见, 国发〔2016〕7 号 [Opinions of the State Council
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participate in company decision-making and management activities. Within German stock
corporations, the Supervisory Board, which consists of the representatives of employees and
shareholders, is permitted to participate in co-determination in business operations under some
limitations, but the Board is not permitted to participate in management activities. 162 Furthermore,
the Chinese Employee Representatives Congress system would hold a meeting regularly to
examine and approve the collective agreements drafts and other matters related to workers’
interests, while the German Works Councils system, which only consists of representatives of
employees, has rights of co-determination on matters that not regulated by laws or collective
agreements through works agreements.
From the analysis above, a grassroots trade union shall be set up based on the employees’
willingness in a company with more than twenty-five employees. Chinese companies have a
statutory duty to establish the Employee Representatives Congress system in their companies. 163
Therefore, according to the Labor Statistical Yearbooks, the total number of Employee
Representatives Congresses was more than the number of grassroots trade unions in almost all
jurisdictions since the year 2012. 164

The Chinese collective bargaining system, which operates under state control by statutes
and policies, resulted in dramatically thicker trade union density than Germany and the United
States. The ACFTU issued opinions that emphasized that companies with more than twenty-five
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employees (including migrant workers) shall set up grassroots trade unions. In practice, the central
government had requested the ACFTU to publish opinions on establishing grassroots trade unions
since 1995. In light of this, some companies would establish grassroots trade unions when local
trade unions encouraged them to do so. Other companies, such as Walmart, refused to establish
grassroots trade unions without their employees’ willingness. Walmart argued that grassroots trade
unions shall establish only if employees are willing to do so in the light of the Trade Union Law;
therefore, the local trade union changed the strategy to solicit employees to set up the grassroots
trade union rather than urge the employer after several years of hard work. In 2014, the ACFTU
issued the Deepening Collective Bargaining Plan 2014-2018 (深化集体协商工作规划(20142018 年)), which encouraged grassroots trade unions to request companies bargaining collectively.
In light of such policies, it is very difficult for enterprises to avoid collective bargaining if the
grassroots trade unions really want to. Actually, because of the Chinese top-down trade union
system and the state-control collective bargaining system, the collective bargaining may be hard
to implement simultaneously without the local trade union incentive and guidance, even if there is
a grassroots trade union in a company. One of the trade union bargainers said that although the
laws did not enforce the duty when a company refuses to bargain collectively, there are always
ways to make a company bargain collectively with its grassroots trade union. For example, the
local trade union could work with the local Labor Inspection Department and/or the local Taxation
Bureau to inspect the company’s tax payment and lawful use of the employed workforce. 165 Under
such situations, a collective agreement can be signed, but there are still two problems: 1) the
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collective agreements stereotypically follow the “collective agreement sample” provided by the
local administrative agency, and there are not enough details in a contract set up through a
bargaining process by the social partners; and 2) there is no efficient way to enforce the collective
contract.166
Under the ACFTU167 and the guidance of the local trade union federations, the density of
union organization in China is around 62 percent of employees organized in the year of 2016,
while German trade union density is 17 percent and American trade union density is 10.3
percent. 168 The ACFTU report of 2017 announced that almost 80 percent of companies with
grassroots trade unions were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 169 Normally, collective
bargaining coverage is broader than trade union membership density because contracts are
sometimes negotiated to set wages and benefits for non-members on a firm, market or industry
basis. As for China, because the grassroots trade union density is around 62 percent, theoretically,
the collective bargaining coverage is likely over 62 percent without official data. Compared with
the Chinese collective bargaining system, the German system, along with a similar trade union
density in the United States, originally had a broader collective bargaining coverage than the
United States in the year of 1960. The German collective bargaining coverage has dropped from
85 percent (1960) to 56 percent (2016) because of its decentralization of collective bargaining. The
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American collective bargaining coverage had been decreased to 12 percent with the synchronously
downturn of trade union density.

TABLE 2: TRADE UNION DENSITY IN CHINA 2016
YEAR 2016
Wage and SalaryGrassroots Trade
Trade Union
earners
Union Members
Density (%)
Private Enterprises
179,971,000
112,189,561
62.3
FIEs (Foreign-owned
13,610,000
9,874,198
72.6
Enterprises and Jointventures)
Funded by Entrepreneurs
13,050,000
8,110,524
62.1
from HK/Macao/Taiwan
SOEs
61,698,000
25,410,104
41.2
*Data from the China Statistical Yearbook 2016 and the China Labor Statistical Yearbook
2016

1.3.2 The Enforcement of Collective Agreements
Unlike the United States and Germany, in China, there are no “peace clauses” (no-strike
clauses) in the collective agreements. And there are no “arbitration clauses” in Chinese collective
agreements because labor arbitration is statutory and mandatory. In the United States, an
arbitration clause is generally one of the standard clauses in the context of collective agreement to
clarify the resolution of disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the collective
agreement if these disputes are not resolved through the grievance process. Different from the
United States labor arbitration system, the Chinese labor arbitration is mandatory statutory
procedure that must be undertaken before a dispute on the collective agreements’ application and
interpretation can be taken to court.
In China, the enforcement of collective agreements is based on the state policy: the ACFTU
Work Plan on Deepening Collective Bargaining (2014-2018).170 The Plan states that collective
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agreements are to be enforced through three methods: 1) the local trade unions’ monitoring and
inspection; 2) employee representatives supervise the enforcement of collective agreements with
the assistant of local trade unions; and 3) cooperation with labor administrative departments to
inspect the enforcement of collective agreements. 171 However, these three methods are hard to
efficiently implement to enforce the collective agreements in practice.
1.3.3 Methods of Avoiding Industrial Actions
The right of strike was deleted from the China Constitution of 1982, but had been included
in the text of the Constitution in 1975 and 1978. Different from industrial actions in the United
States and Germany, industrial actions in China are organized by the employees themselves
with/without other non-governmental organizations’ assistance, rather than organized by trade
unions. Article 27 of the Labor Union Law (2001) states that if there is an industrial action, the
relevant grassroots trade union has the duty to represent the employees to negotiate with their
employer in order to resume production. The industrial actions, therefore, are not generally
prohibited in laws and both public and private sector employees could take part in the industrial
actions. However, the right to organize strikes is not authorized to grassroots trade unions, so
strikes that occur in China are wildcat strikes. Also, there is no regulation limiting the industrial
actions, and there is no peace clause in the context of collective agreements in China. As for the
central government, the governments generally allow industrial actions, but they did not welcome
political stoppages.
TABLE 3: COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS (PRIVATE SECTOR)
GERMANY

USA

CHINA

Trade Unions on Distributing the Plan for the All-China Federation of Trade Unions to Deepen the Work of
Collective Negotiation (2014-2018)], 总工发[2014] 11 号[ ACFTU [2014] No. 11].
171
Id.
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Sector/Company-level

Extending
Collective
Agreements

Uncommon use
[Extensions are issued by the
Federal or regional governments
upon request of both parties and
agreement by a bipartite
committee (its consent is
necessary, but not sufficient, the
Government is not obliged to
issue the extension). Extensions
under the Posted Workers Act
are limited to minimum wage
and other minimum conditions.
Use of erga Sector level: Double affiliation
omnes
principle (only to members of
Clauses
signing organizations).
Company level: Union Members

Derogations
from
Collective
Agreements

Enforcement
of Collective
Agreements

Strikes

Company-level

No

All workers in
bargaining unit

General opening clauses and opt- No
out can be concluded in sectorlevel agreements.
Topic: Mainly wages, working
time and temporary agency
work. The collective bargaining
parties may also allow
derogations in other topics.
Do agreements typically include Do agreements
a peace clause? Yes
typically include a
peace clause? Yes
Do agreements typically include
a mediation/arbitration
Do agreements
procedure? no
typically include a
mediation/arbitration
procedure? Yes
Can
mediation/arbitration
procedure
compulsory? Yes
Private: yes
Yes
Are political stoppages included? Are political
Yes
stoppages included?
No

Company-level (in
most cases)/sectorlevel (rare)
No discussion

Not clear
(sometimes
workers signed
both employment
contract and
collective contract)
No discussion

Monitored by the
Administrative
agency and trade
union

No regulations and
no court case:
generally, strikes
are allowed.
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political stoppages
sometimes
occurred.
Lockouts
Private: Yes
Trade Unions The density of trade unions:
Decreased since the late 1990s
the numbers of trade unions
since the late 1990s: stable
Opening
Yes
Clauses
Wage
Pattern bargaining (strong)
Coordination

Private: Yes
No discussion
The density of trade
Relative highest
unions: Decreased
trade union density
since the year of 1950
No

No discussion

No
Fragmented Wage
Bargaining

No
Extremely
Fragmented Wage
Bargaining

III. Empirical Analysis of Strikes in the Private Sector

1.1 Overview Literature Review

In China, prior research suggests that trade union organization has had positive effects on
wages, productivity, and output. Budd, John W. found that over the period 1994 – 2008 in China,
union density did not have any significant influence on average wage levels, but union density was
positively correlated with aggregate productivity and aggregate economic output. 172 However,
Yaoyang and Zhong Ninghua showed that for the years 2000-2005, trade unions and collective
bargaining in China observably improved employees’ wages and coverage of pension
compensation, while cutting average work hours. 173 Finally, in yet another study Wei Xiahai and

172 Budd, John W., Wei Chi, Yijiang Wang, and Qianyun Xie. "What do unions in China do? Provincial-level
evidence on wages, employment, productivity, and economic output." Journal of Labor Research 35, no. 2 (2014):
185-204.
173 These differences might reflect different sampling frames, measurement, data accuracy and measurement error,
and levels of aggregation. See more Yaoyang and Zhong Ninghua (姚洋, 钟宁桦), Gonghui Shifou Tigao le
Gongren de Fuli? (工会是否提高了工人的福利? ――来自 12 个城市的证据) [Do unions improve workers'
welfare? -- Evidence from 12 Chinese cities], 北京大学中国经济研究中心 [Peking University China Economy
Research Center], http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/webmanager/wkfiles/7333_1_paper.pdf ;
Li Ming and Xu Jianwei (李明, 徐建炜), Shuicong Zhongguo Gonghui Huiyuan Shenjia zhong Huoyi (谁从中国工
会会员身价中获益) [Who Benefits from China’s Trade Union?]，经济研究 2014 年第五期[Economy Research
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Dong Zhiqiang showed that trade unions in the private sector in China stimulated wage increases
and workers’ productivity, and the trade unions have made the rate of productivity increase quicker
than the growth rate of wages. 174 The labor costs (per unit) have increased a lot in the laborintensive industries since 1997; however, the labor costs (per unit) have declined in the capitalintensive industries, which indicates that the cheap labor costs remain in the capital-intensive
industries. 175 Under such situations, trade unions would have more effect on the wage and
productivity in the capital-intensive industries rather than the labor-intensive industries. 176
In the traditional manufacturing sector, the capital-intensive industry, such as Foxconn
Technology Co., attempts to develop technology to replace workers and save labor costs. In return,
workers’ wages decrease as the number of hours worked also decrease. Then, the labor-intensive
industry, such as Yue Yuen and Lide shoes factories, could relocate or close their factories,
subcontract, or change the owner of their operations to reduce labor costs.
More details in the studies demonstrated other features. First, that Chinese trade unions
made changes on working conditions based on their enterprises’ type; for example, most trade
unions increased workers’ wage rates in the state-owned enterprises, but in the private enterprises,
foreign-owned companies, and Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan-owned companies, trade unions
mainly changed the working hours rather than wage rate. 177 However, the study showed that
overtime has declined, probably as a result of declined purchase orders. For example, in Yue Yuan

2014 Vol.5], http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/webmanager/wkfiles/2012/201506_16_paper.pdf; see
more supra note 172.
174 Wei Xiahai and Dong Zhiqiang (魏下海, 董志强), Gonghui Shifou Gaishan Laodong Shouru Fene (工会是否
改善劳动收入份额?) [Does the union improve the share of labor income?], 经济研究 2013 年第八期 [Economy
Research 2013 vol.8].
175 However, China’s wages have increased at a much faster rate than productivity since 1997.
See more Li, Hongbin, Lei Li, Binzhen Wu, and Yanyan Xiong. "The end of cheap Chinese labor." Journal of
Economic Perspectives26, no. 4 (2012): 57-74, at 63.
176 See supra note 174.
177 See supra note 173, Liming (李明)

50

Shoes factories, workers do not work overtime because the number of purchase orders had
decreased.178 Second, that trade unions impact different types of workers in different ways. For
example, trade unions had stronger influence over low-skilled workers with regard to working time
decline. In the state-owned enterprises with the grassroots trade unions, intermediate skilled
workers would receive higher wage premiums than low skilled workers, and the high-skilled
workers would receive lower wage premiums than low-skilled workers.
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Third, the

government’s attitude towards industrial actions varied. In some situations, governments would
like to be a part of the negotiation phase in the process of tripartite bargaining, and sit-down strikes
were not prohibited inside companies, especially the foreign-owned companies. However, the
government does not want workers to protest in public places or to be involved in public
disorder.180
In the United States, during the 1880s and the 1890s, ninety percent of strikes resulted in
wage change, which was either an increase or no change at all. 181 The strikes were successful
because of the policies ensured by craft unionism. 182 The trade unions could choose to either
holdout or strike after the expiration date of the existing collective bargaining agreements. From
1939 to 1945, the unionization was the more economically beneficial approach as a result of no
well institutionalized unions and inefficiency strikes in industrial sectors. 183 From 1970 to 1980,
strikes were attractive for trade unions if there was a decline in the real wage and unemployment;

178 Jiemi Yuyuan: Gongren Bagong (解密裕元：一位工人眼里的大罢工) [A Strike in Yuyuan], 中国劳工通讯
[China Labor Bulletin], https://clb.org.hk/schi/content/解密裕元：一位工人眼里的大罢工.
179 See supra note 173, Liming (李明).
180 Chih-Jou Jay Chen (陳志柔), Zhongguo Quanwei Zhengtixia de Jiti Kangyi: Taizichang Dabagong de Anli
Fenxi (中國威權政體下的集體抗議: 台資廠大罷工的案例分析), Taiwanese Sociology 30 (2015): 1-53, at 17-18.
181
Card, David, and Craig A. Olson. "Bargaining power, strike durations, and wage outcomes: An analysis of strikes
in the 1880s." Journal of Labor Economics 13, no. 1 (1995): 32-61, at 58.
182 Id.
183 Rubin, Beth A. "Class struggle American style: Unions, strikes and wages." American Sociological
Review (1986): 618-633, at 630.
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however, after the year of 1981, the attractiveness of strikes declined as a result of the threat of
permanent replacements.184 The empirical studies demonstrate that strikes are more likely to occur
when: 1) the real wage decreases either as a result of previous collective contracts or the holdout
threat; 2) the unemployment declines and the worker’s reservation wage increases during the strike
threat, but strikes are less likely to occur when the industry labor market is tight; 3) the companies’
demand focuses on improving profitability at the cost of widening wage gap; 4) the cost of strikes
diminish, but the costs of strikes will increase when there are more NLRB elections; 5) less
experienced bargainers get involved in labor disputes resulting in strikes. 185 Since 1982, the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that the standard of counting work stoppages was
changed from disputes that involved at least six workers to disputes that involved at least 1,000
workers and at least one full shift. 186 The Bureau dataset includes the number of stoppages, the
number of workers involved, and the days idle.
As for Germany, the study focused on the duration of work stoppages, workers’
participation, and distribution of stoppages according to industry sectors and jurisdictions. The
strikes dataset issued by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) does
not record strikes that are less than one day or less than ten workers participated. From 1900-1914,
the number of working days lost and workers involved was considerably high; however, in the
period of inter-war (1919 to 1932), the annual average strike duration had decreased from thirty
days per year to fifteen days per year. In the post-war period (1949-1978), the annual average

184 Cramton, Peter C., and Joseph S. Tracy. "The determinants of US labor disputes." Journal of Labor
Economics 12, no. 2 (1994): 180-209.
185 Id.; Tracy, Joseph S. "An investigation into the determinants of US strike activity." The American Economic
Review (1986): 423-436; Reder, Melvin W., and George R. Neumann. "Conflict and contract: The case of
strikes." Journal of Political Economy 88, no. 5 (1980): 867-886.
186 Perry, Leonard J., and Patrick J. Wilson. "Trends in work stoppages: A global perspective.", at 10 (2004).
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strike duration dropped to six days per year. 187 Consistent with the average duration of strikes, the
workers’ participation rate had increased during the post-war period from 7.9 to 9.8. 188 In light of
various industry sectors, the strike participation rate had declined in traditional sector industries,
such as mining, textiles, the building trade, and the iron and steel industry. However, the strike
participation rate had dramatically increased in the engineering industry and mildly increased in
the public service sectors. 189 In the Baden-Wiirttemberg state, different types of strikes were called
in different industries; for instance: 1) in the engineering industry there were wild-cat strikes; 2)
in the iron and steel industry there were protest strikes (picketing); and 3) in the textile, timber,
chemical and printing, tile-laying industries and the public service industries there were official
strikes.190 The main reason for the strikes is the issue of wage demands in the private sectors. Also,
strikes are triggered by relocation or closure of companies if the demands in the collective
agreements require regulation of plant closure or relocation. 191
Further, the OECD Employment Outlook 2018 explained the role of collective bargaining
systems in OECD countries (including the United States and Germany). Among the OECD
member countries, Germany is a typical country with the predominantly centralized bargaining
structure and covert coordinated model, and the United States has a decentralized bargaining
structure.192 The study indicated that: 1) the coordinated system triggers higher employment and

187 the annually average strikes duration: Days lost divided by workers involved, See more Muller‐Jentsch,
Walther. "Strikes and strike trends in West Germany, 1950–78." Industrial Relations Journal 12, no. 4 (1981): 3657, at 37-38.
188 Participation rate: strike participation per 1,000 workers. See Id. at 38-39.
189 See supra note 187, at 39-41.
190 See supra note 187, at 40-41.
191Germany: Industrial relations profile Facts and figures,
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/6494EIRO_GERMANY_201.pdf, at 7.
192 Overt co-ordination is based on centralized concertation of bargaining rounds among the peak associations of
business and labor (possibly in co-operation with the state). covert co-ordination relies on intra-associational
governance by the peak associations and/or the pace-setting role of bargaining in key sectors. See more Traxler,
Franz. "Collective bargaining: Levels and coverage." Employment Outlook (1994): 167-194, at 175.
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lower unemployment than the decentralized system; 2) wages are higher when covered by the
company level collective agreements rather than the sector level collective agreements; 3) the
quality of working environment is lower in the firms without recognized workers’ representations;
4) wages and productivity are less tightly when the collective bargaining system is stronger. 193 In
the United States, large numbers of samples show that unionized establishments are more
productive than non-unionized ones.194 In Germany, the research explains the interaction between
centralized collective bargaining and establishment-level codetermination. If establishments are
covered by collective agreements, works councils will want to take part in productivity activities
rather than rent-seeking activities, and works councils make a substantial impact on productivity
but less of an impact on wages because the works councils are aimed at cooperation and
codetermination195 ; and 5) wage dispersion is greater in systems without collective bargaining or
in firms setting wages independently. 196 Another empirical study on unionism and wage inequality
indicated that the unions reduce the overall wage inequality among workers. 197 Additionally, the
German trade union system provides other evidence for What Do Unions Do?, and the positive
and negative impacts of the German trade union system are counterbalanced. 198 This is because
the German’s unique system is supported by constitution law which prevents union wage
differentials, and the trade unions are aimed at featherbedding and reducing strikes. 199 The

193 OECD (2018), OECD Employment Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing,
Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2018-en.
194
Bennett, James T., and Bruce E Kaufman. What Do Unions Do?: A Twenty-Year Perspective. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Publishers, Chapter 7, 2007.
195 Hübler, Olaf, and Uwe Jirjahn. "Works councils and collective bargaining in Germany: the impact on
productivity and wages." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 50, no. 4 (2003): 471-491.
196 See supra note 193.
197 See supra note 194; Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. "Unions and wage
inequality." Journal of Labor Research 25, no. 4 (2004): 519-559, at 555-56.
198
Schnabel, Claus. "Trade unions and productivity: the German evidence." British journal of industrial
relations 29, no. 1 (1991): 15-24, at 22.
199 Id.
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German’s strength of unionism and the strength of employers organizations rise and fall
together.200
As a result of globalization, the employment share of jobs classifications in these three
countries has shifted. Since 1980s, the U.S. labor market displays a job polarization, which means
a growth in the employment share of non-routine jobs but a decline in routine jobs, especially
manual routine manufacturing. 201 As for the German labor market, the service sectors have
increased, while the manufacture sectors have declined during the years of 1993-2002.202 However,
different than the U.S. manufacturing sectors, the German manufacturing did not decline as
intensely as a result of globalization, and the manufacture jobs remained in the economy. 203
Germany is similar to the U.S. labor market because the German employment share of routine jobs
has continuously declined, while the employment share of non-routine jobs has increased. 204 The
German manual routine jobs declined during the years 1979-1999; however, as technology has
developed and become well-established, some of the non-routine manual jobs became routine
manual jobs again. Germany is different than the United States because the German employment
polarization did not come with the problem of wage inequality. 205 Those two did not occur together
because the German trade unions made impacts on the wage setting system. 206 As this paper

200 Thelen, Kathleen. "The Paradox of Globalization: Labor Relations in Germany and Beyond." Comparative
Political Studies 36, no. 8 (2003): 859-880.
201 Maximiliano Dvorkin, The Growing Skill Divide in the U.S. Labor Market, the Economy Blog,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/may/growing-skill-divide-us-labor-market (last visited Dec. 9,
2018).
202 Wolfgang Dauth, Sebastian Findeisen, Jens Südekum, Sectoral employment trends in Germany: The effect of
globalization on their micro anatomy, voxeu, https://voxeu.org/article/globalisation-and-sectoral-employmenttrends-germany (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
203 Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen, and Jens Suedekum. "Trade and manufacturing jobs in
Germany." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 337-42.
204 Bachmann, Ronald, Merve Cim, and Colin Green. "Long‐Run Patterns of Labour Market Polarization: Evidence
from German Micro Data." British Journal of Industrial Relations, at 10 (2018).
205
Pikos, Anna Katharina, and Stephan L. Thomsen. "Tasks, Employment and Wages: An Analysis of the German
Labor Market from 1979 to 2012." (2015).
206
Id.
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mentioned before, the prior research explained that the trade unions reduced wage dispersion when
they have strong bargaining power as economic players. As for China, the empirical studies
explain that the employment share of manual routine jobs has increased from 1990 to 2005. 207
However, another study indicates that within the urban areas, the employment share of manual
routine jobs has declined since 1990 while the share of routine cognitive jobs has increased; this
is because of technology development and the reform of SOEs. 208
Prior studies have focused on trade unions and wages, but there are few studies that analyze
the Chinese industrial actions and the collective bargaining model. In order to completely
understand China’s bargaining model, the next chapter of this paper uses a qualitative and
quantitative analysis that focuses on the Chinese industrial actions, including workers’ demands,
industry sectors and firm types, types of actions involved, and government responses.

1.2 Empirical Analysis and Case Study of Strikes in China

1.2.1 Methodology
The paper uses three datasets in China. The first is the raw dataset from the China Labor
Bulletin (CLB), and its sample size is 9,241 disputes in the research including all provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities in the mainland of China through 2011 to 2017. The
variables used in the first dataset are categorical variables including the workers’ demands, the
types of industry sectors, the company forms, the government responses, the way to process
industrial actions, and the scale of participants. The other two data sets are the official Purchase
Management Index (PMI) from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) through 2011

207

Ge, Peng, Wenkai Sun, and Zhong Zhao. "Automation Biased Technology and Employment Structures in China:
1990 to 2015." (2018).
208 Ebenstein, Avraham, Margaret McMillan, Yaohui Zhao, and Chanchuan Zhang. "Understanding the Role of
China in the ‘Decline’of US Manufacturing." Manuscript, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2011).
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to 2017 which focuses on large companies and state-owned enterprises, and the last one is the
Purchase Management Index (PMI issued by Caixin and IHS Markit) which focuses on small and
medium-sized enterprises.
Regarding the first dataset, the workers’ demands have been classified into four categories:
wage theft, statutory severance pay, working conditions, and others. As for wage theft disputes,
workers asked for wage arrears in some cases, and in the other cases, workers protested for unpaid
insurance and equal pay for equal work. The common situation in the construction sector is that
the construction company contracted with a provider to work on the project, but a cash flow
problem occurred during the project and workers did not receive their wages. There are three
common situations in the manufacturing sector: first, the employer has a serious business loss that
he cannot afford his employees’ wages. Or the employer intended to reduce labor costs, so he
closed and relocated his operation without fully paying his employees. Second, in order to reduce
labor costs, the employer intentionally pays less insurance for his employees in terms of the
minimum insurance standard issued by the local labor administrative agency, which is prohibited
by laws. Third, a successor employer decreased the workers’ wages. As for statutory severance
pay disputes, workers protested for statutory severance pay when the employment relationship will
be terminated or had been lawfully terminated by their employers. There are three common
situations: first, the employment will be terminated or has been terminated because the employer
has a plan to relocate his operation. Second, the employment will be terminated because the
employer subcontracted the workers’ jobs to another provider. Third, the employment will be
terminated because the business has a successor. As for working conditions disputes, workers ask
for wage increase and benefits in most cases, and in other cases, workers protested for working
time system and/or other the physical conditions and mental demands.
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The collective disputes in the CLB data set are broken down according to type of dispute,
industry and type of firm in Figures 1, 2 and 3. In Figure 1 we see that wage theft disputes made
up 68.77% of all types of disputes, and severance pay disputes and working conditions disputes
made up 7.49% and 9.31% respectively. The sample size is 9,241. In Figure 2 we see that disputes
mostly happened in the construction and manufacturing sectors above 31%, and disputes occurred
in the services and transportation sectors are 17.06% and 13.96% respectively. The sample size is
9,234 in Figure 2 which is less than 9,241 because very few data were not reported from the raw
dataset. In Figure 3, we see that disputes are frequently occurred in the private enterprises reached
71.35%, 15.94% disputes happened in the state-owned enterprises, 7.64% disputes took place in
the foreign-invested enterprises, and 5.07% disputes appeared in the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned
enterprises. In Figure 3, the sample size is 6,712 which is less than 9,241 because the figure
excludes the missing data related to forms of enterprises.
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The first research question is trying to figure out the important element that induces
different types of workers’ demands. In this research question, the independent variables are
59

categorical variables which include the industry sectors (IV1) and the type of firms (IV2). In light
of the research purpose, the industry sectors are classified into five sectors: construction,
manufacturing, services, transportation, and others, and the type of firms are divided into four
types: private-owned enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, state-owned enterprises, and Hong
Kong/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises. The dependent variable (DV) is also a categorical
variable which is the workers’ demand in strikes. The workers’ demands are divided into four
types: wage theft, severance pay, working conditions, and others. The raw dataset has some
missing data that did not report in the industry sectors and firms, therefore, the robustness check
was used to test whether the missing data would make the distribution change. From Table 1 below,
the missing IV1 does not make a significant difference on the dependent variable (DV) according
to the standard deviation and mean value, which means that the missing data can be ignored. Then,
the missing IV2 can also be ignored because its standard deviation and mean value did not show a
significant difference after the missing data dropped from the raw data. A multinomial logistic
regression model is used to analyze the influence that the sector of industry and the type of firm
make on workers’ demands in strikes.
The second research question discusses how the industry activity makes an impact on
government responses. In this research question, both the independent variable and dependent
variable are categorical variables. The independent variable is the way to process strikes (IV)
which is divided into seven categories: block roads, protests, protest strikes, strikes, sit-down, sitdown and protests, and others actions. The dependent variable is the way to respond an industry
activity (DV) which is classified into six categories: arrests, arrests and government
mediation/negotiation, government mediation/negotiation, police, police and government
mediation/negotiation, and other responses. Within the sample size of 6,709, and with the raw
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dataset missing variables that did not report, the second research question produces 2,179.
According to the robustness check in Table 2, the missing independent data would not have made
a significant difference on the dependent variable. The multinomial logistic regression model is
used to examine the impact on how the industry activity makes a difference on government
responses.
Further, the third research question focuses on the manufacturing sector and tries to
measure the important factor for different types of workers’ demands. Also, both the dependent
variables and the independent variables are categorical variables. The dependent variable is the
workers’ demands (DV), and the independent variables are Purchase Manager’s Index (PMI)
datasets (IV1 and IV2) and the form of firms (IV3). Based on the sample size 6,709, the
manufacturing sector sample size is 2,389. Before analyzing the dataset, the missing data shall be
tested by the robustness check. As Table 3 shows, the standard deviation and mean values do not
have a critical difference so the missing data could not change the measurement result.
Multinomial logistic regression can be used regarding to the third research question.
Table 1: Robustness Check
V1 missing data
Variable
Obs
DV
7
V1 without missing data
Variable
Obs
DV
9,234
V2 missing data
Variable
Obs
DV
2,525
V2 without missing data
Variable
Obs
DV
6,709

Mean
2.428571

Std. Dev.
0.7867958

Min
1

Max
3

Mean
2.729695

Std. Dev.
0.8199372

Min
1

Max
4

Mean
2.733069

Std. Dev.
0.893244

Min
1

Max
4

Mean
2.728425

Std. Dev.
0.7906344

Min
1

Max
4
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Table 2: Robustness Check
IV missing data
Variable
Obs
Response
13
(DV)
IV without missing data
Variable
Obs
Response
2,179
(DV)

Mean
3.461538

Std. Dev.
0.877058

Min

Mean
3.414869

Std. Dev.
1.249235

Min

Max
1

4

Max
1

6

Table3: Robustness Check
IV3 missing data
Variable
Obs
DV
482
IV3 without missing data
Variable
Obs
DV

2,389

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2.813278

0.6962851

1

4

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2.782336

0.7283487

1

4

1.2.2. Empirical Analysis
Question 1: The Impact of Type of Firm and Industry on Worker Demands
As for the first research question, the regression result explains that the multinomial logit
has set the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises of IV1 and the service sector of IV2 as the base
for independent variables, and the multinomial logit has set the working conditions as the base
outcome for dependent variable. The model estimates the relative important factor in one type of
workers’ demand relative to the demand of working conditions, comparing other firm types to
HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises and other types of industry sectors relative to the service
sector given the other variables in the model are held constant. For example, for FIEs relative to
HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises, the relative risk for wage theft strikes relative to working
conditions strikes would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.559 given the other variables in
the model are held constant.
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Table 4 indicates which type of firm/industry sector is likely to be of relative importance
when severance pay demands or wage theft demands occurred relative to working conditions
demands. From Table 4, the private-owned firm is positive and relative importance factor in the
wage theft demands compared to the working conditions demands. Based on Table 5 and Table 4,
the wage theft demand was more likely to occur in the private-owned firms than in the SOEs, but
it was even less likely to happen in the FIEs and Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan-owned Enterprises.
Compared to the working conditions demand, the private enterprise plays a positive role on the
wage theft demand, and the FIE plays a relatively negative role on the wage theft demand given
that the industry sector is held constant. If the firm is held constant, compared to the service sector,
the construction sector is a relatively strong and important factor as for wage theft demands rather
than working conditions demands. In the Table 5, the wage theft was much more likely to happen
in the construction sector than in the manufacturing sector and the service sector, but it was less
likely to occur in the transportation sector. From Table 5, 42.8% of the wage theft happened in the
construction sector, 32.2% were in the manufacturing sector, and 17.3% were in the service sector.
Further, 78.9% of the wage theft were in the private-owned firms in the construction sector, and
74.8% of these demands were in the manufacturing sector. In the Table 5, wage theft frequently
occurred in the manufacturing sector, especially in private-owned firms. In sum, the private-owned
firms of the construction and manufacturing sectors are where the most worker’s demands for
wage theft occur, which means the labor administrative agency should pay more attention to the
private-owned firms in the construction and manufacturing sector to mitigate wage theft problems.
Table 4
DV: Employees Demands in Strikes (2011-17)
Y4: Working Conditions (base outcome)
Y1: Others
Y2: Severance Pay
Y3: Wage Theft
Coef.
RRR
Coef.
RRR
Coef.
RRR
IV1
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FIE
Private-owned
firms
SOE
HK/Macao/Tai
wan Owned
enterprises
(base)
IV2
Construction

0.286
(0.93)
1.299***
(4.46)
1.224***
(4.01)
0
(.)

1.330
3.667
3.401

0.478
1.613
(0.79)
Manufacturing
0.174
1.190
(0.90)
Others
0.0825
1.086
(0.29)
Transportation
1.592***
4.914
(8.41)
Service
0
(.)
_cons
-1.369***
0.254
(-4.33)
N
6,709
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

-0.0511
(-0.25)
0.309
(1.50)
0.00217
(0.01)
0
(.)

0.950

0.294
(0.47)
0.695***
(3.91)
-0.413
(-1.35)
-2.315***
(-7.19)
0
(.)
-0.229
(-0.97)

1.342

1.362
1.002

2.003
0.661
0.099

0.796

-0.581**
(-3.03)
2.007***
(10.96)
0.0500
(0.25)
0
(.)

0.559

4.093***
(8.81)
0.149
(1.04)
0.489*
(2.26)
-2.889***
(-16.18)
0
(.)
0.734***
(3.63)

59.913

7.443
1.051

1.161
1.631
0.056

2.0826

For the severance pay compared to the working conditions disputes, the type of industry
sector plays an important role for the severance pay disputes given that the variable of the firm is
constant. The manufacturing sector is a positive factor in the severance pay disputes, and the
transportation sector plays a negative role in the severance pay disputes. According to Table 5, the
severance pay dispute was more likely to occur in the manufacturing sector, but the working
conditions dispute was more likely to occur in the transportation sector. More than 77% of the
severance pay disputes were in the manufacturing sector. Further, in the manufacturing sector,
around 32.06% of the severance pay disputes were in either FIEs or private companies, and 21.5%
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were in the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned firms. Therefore, the policies and laws should focus on the
manufacturing sector to keep industrial peace regarding severance pay.
Within the sample size of the first question, and in light of Table 5, 48.4% of these disputes
occurred in the manufacturing sector, 25% of the disputes occurred in the transportation, and 17.9%
happened in the service sector. As for the manufacturing sector, 39.7% of the working conditions
disputes took place in FIEs, 28.2% of the disputes took place in the private-owned firms, and 22.9%
of these disputes took place in the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned Enterprises. Generally, the working
conditions disputes were more likely to happen in the manufacturing sector, especially in the FIEs
plants. Thus, the policies and laws should focus on the manufacturing sector to keep industrial
peace when there is a working conditions demand.
Table 5
Employee Demand: Wage Theft
Enterprise Type
Industry
FIEs
Hong
Sector
Kong/Macao/Taiwanowned Enterprises
Construction
8
5
Manufacturing
139
143
Services
12
8
Transportation
1
1
Others
11
1
Total
171
158
Employee Demand: Severance Pay
Enterprise Type
Industry types FIEs
HK/Macao/Taiwanowned Enterprises
Construction
0
0
Manufacturing
143
96
Services
20
1
Transportation
1
0
Others
2
1
Total
166
98
Employee Demand: Working Conditions
Enterprise types

Privateowned
Enterprises
1,587
1,131
736
88
132
3,674

SOEs

Privateowned
Enterprises
2
143
44
11
6
206

SOEs

411
100
58
15
110
694

4
64
25
2
14
109

Total

2,011
1,513
814
105
254
4,697

Total

6
446
90
14
23
579
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Industry types

Construction
Manufacturing
Services
Transportation
Others
Total

FIEs

HK/Macao/Taiwanowned Enterprises

2
104
8
8
1
123

1
60
3
0
0
64

PrivateSOEs
owned
Enterprises
0
2
74
24
46
40
113
14
3
38
236
118

Total

5
262
97
135
42
541

Question 2: The Impact of Industrial Actions on the Government Response
Within the sample size of the second research question, the results explain the relative
importance of actions taken by workers in industrial activities that make an influence on the
government

responses.

In

this

question,

the

dependent

variable,

the

government

mediation/negotiation (DV), has set a base outcome relative to other government responses, and
the independent variable block road is the basement relative to other industrial actions.
In this research question, a protest refers to a protest and demonstration in a public area. A
strike refers to a refusal to work. A sit-down refers to workers sitting down at their workplace. A
protest strike refers to the strike where workers use both protest and strike. For arrests that occur
during the government mediation/ negotiation, the relative risk for arrest would be expected to
increase if workers chose to block roads rather than protest, sit-down, strike, or other activities. As
compared to the government mediation/negotiation, the risk for police involvement would be
expected to increase if workers choose to block roads rather than protest, sit-down, strike, or other
activities. In other words, the government does not like aggressive industrial activities, especially
blocking roads. Therefore, if workers protest, sit-down, or strike the result will be the government
mediation/negotiation response. If workers choose to block roads, the government is more likely
to decide to arrest or get the police involved. Moreover, if workers block roads and sit-down, they
are more likely to get arrested or have police involvement. Table 7(2) displays the numbers of
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workers involved in industrial activities. The table explains that China is different than the western
countries, and industrial actions in China do not frequently involve thousands of workers. In fact,
less than 5% of industrial actions involved more than one thousand workers.
According to Table 7(1), when the workers make demands for wage theft, the workers do
not usually choose to block roads. However, if they cannot get payment after they performed their
tasks, the workers had no choice but to use aggressive industrial actions, such as block roads.
Therefore, blocking roads occurs more often for wage theft demands as compared to working
conditions demands or severance pay demands. Workers preferred to protest in a public area to get
sympathy and to get the government’s attention on wage theft issues.
In workers’ demands of severance pay cases, if an employer will close or relocate their
operation, workers will strike in response. However, workers’ strikes encourage their employer to
close or relocate the operation. At this time, workers could not enforce the employer to bargain
with them except through the strike. Thus, a strike for severance pay is inefficient. According to
Table 7(1), only 22.08% of the strikes for severance pay were put on the bargaining table. Strikes
for working conditions are different than the strikes for severance pay because 56.86% of working
conditions strikes enforced were on the bargaining table. For working conditions, workers usually
preferred to strike because their refusals to work put pressure on their employer to bargain with
them. However, in the manufacturing sector, the orders would decline in the operation later after
there was a strike.
Thus, not all labor disputes were put on a bargaining table due to the lack of an efficient
collective bargaining system, and if the disputes are not put on the bargaining table then there is
no way to resolve these labor disputes.
Table 6
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Y: Government Responses (2011-17)
Y6: Government Mediation/Negotiation (base outcome)
Y1: Arrests

IV
Protest
Sit-down
Sit-down
and
Protest
Strike

Others
Protest
Strike
Block
Roads
(base)
_cons

N

Y2: Arrests
&Government
Mediation/Negotiation
Coef.
RRR
(z)

Coef. (z)

RRR

-0.831**
(-3.2)
-1.034**
(-3.46)
-0.362
(-0.88)

0.435

2.331**
*
(-8.48)

0.097

-2.603***
(-4.09)

-1.376**
(-2.99)
-0.624
(-1.46)

0.252

-1.54
(-1.39)
0.000
(0.00)

0.356
0.696

0.536

-2.741**
(-3.38)
-2.752*
(-2.54)
-14.925
(-0.02)

0
(.)
1.135
(5.13)

3.111

Y3: Police

Coef. (z)

RRR

-0.704**
(-3.01)
-0.271
(-1.05)
0.025
(0.07)

0.495

0.074

2.292***
(-9.78)

0.214

-0.793**
(-2.19)
-0.639
(-1.69)

0.065
0.064
3.30E07

0.999
0
(.)

-1.099
(-2.85)

Y4: Police
&Government
Mediation/Negotiation
Coef.
RRR
(z)

2.125***
(10.43)

Coef.
(z)

RRR

2.858**
(2.77)
-0.554
(-0.39)
1.505
(1.18)

17.428

-1.622***
(-4.24)
-1.981***
(-3.85)
-0.211
(-0.40)

0.197

0.101

-1.966***
(-5.44)

0.14

-1.098
(-0.88)

0.334

0.452

-0.483
(-0.92)
-0.329
(-0.62)

0.617

2.449*
(2.17)
-12.236
(-0.02)

11.577

3.296**
(-3.24)

0.037

0.763
1.025

0.528

0.138
0.81

0.72

0
(.)

0.333

Y5: Others

8.37

0
(.)
-0.077
(-0.28)

0.926

0.574
4.502

4.85E06
0
(.)

2179

t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 7(1)
Worker’s Demands: Working Conditions
Actions
Responses
Block Protest SitRoads
down
Arrest(s)
Arrests
and
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Police
Police
and
Government

3
1

6
0

1
1

sit-down
and
protest
2
0

Strike

Other
s

Protest
strike

Total

5
1

1
0

5
0

23
3

1

5

0

1

58

2

1

68

13
5

8
0

5
1

3
0

30
8

1
0

10
1

70
15

68

Mediation/Nego
tiation
Others
0
0
Total
23
19
Workers’ Demands: Wage Theft
Action
Responses
Block Protest
road
Arrest(s)
66
88
Arrests
and
3
1
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Government
22
74
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Police
183
294
Police
and
11
12
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Others
1
59
Total
286
528
Workers’ Demands: Severance Pay
Action
Responses
Block Protest
roads
Arrest(s)
Arrests
and
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Police
Police and
Government
Mediation/Nego
tiation
Total

0
8

0
6

0
102

1
5

0
17

1
180

Sitdown

Strike

Other
s

Protest
strike

Tota
l

45
0

Sit-down
and
Protest
15
0

9
1

9
1

5
1

237
7

40

6

39

11

2

194

253
3

82
6

31
3

43
7

16
4

902
46

1
342

2
111

2
85

2
73

0
28

67
1453

Sitdown

Strike

Other
s

Protest
strike

Tota
l

22
2

0
0

8
3

75
10

13
4

21
1

3
0

Sit-down
and
protest
8
0

3

9

5

5

17

1

3

43

14
7

39
5

23
2

13
1

28
8

3
0

9
3

129
26

41

75

33

27

77

4

26

283
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Numbers of Workers
Involved
1-100 Persons
100-1000 Persons
1000+Persons
Total

Table 7 (2)
Freq.

Percent

Cum.

4,874
1,319
283

75.26
20.37
4.37

75.26
95.63
100.00

6,476 (not include
233 missing data)

100.00

From the above analysis, the manufacturing sector reached 31.09% of all kinds of
collective disputes, and the construction sector reached 31.89% of all kinds of disputes. Most
disputes in the construction sector resulted from wage theft, however, all three type of workers’
demands (wage theft, working condition, and severance pay) were likely to occur in the
manufacturing sector. Thus, the third research question focuses on workers’ demands in the
manufacturing sector.
Question 3: The Impact of Manufacturing Economic Health on the Manufacturing Workers
Demands
Normally, workers’ demands for better working conditions will happen while the economic
condition of the manufacturing sector is in good shape, however, the demands for wage theft and
severance pay will happen when the economic condition is not as good as before. The Purchasing
Manager’s Index (PMI) is to provide information about current manufacturing conditions
including production, employment, new orders, and raw materials inventories; so, the research
question chooses the PMI dataset as references for measuring the economic health of the
manufacturing conditions. The PMI1 index focuses on large-size firms and SOEs, and the PMI2
dataset focuses on small and medium size firms. The dependent variable (working conditions) has
been set as a base outcome, and the independent variables (HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned firms) (IV3)
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have been set as the base. The other two independent variables are the PMI1 >=50 (IV1) and the
PMI2>= 50 (IV2).
As compared to the workers’ demands for working conditions, the relative risk for wage
theft would be expected to increase by a factor of 2.190 if the PMI1>=50, and if the firm type and
the PMI2 were constant. On the other hand, when comparing the wage theft to the working
conditions demands, the relative risk of the wage theft would be expected to decrease by a factor
of 0.709 if the PMI2>=50, and if the other two independent variables were constant. That is to say,
the wage theft has a higher possibility to occur when the large firms’ and SOEs are expanding. As
for severance pay compared to working conditions demands, the risk of severance pay would be
expected to increase by a factor of 1.615 when the large firms and SOEs were expanding. In sum,
and as opposed to the general thinking, the result indicates that wage theft and severance pay
disputes were more likely to occur when large firms and SOEs were expanding, which means
companies demand focuses on improving profitability at the cost of missed workers’ wage.
If firms in the manufacturing sector have similar economic conditions, the firm types, in
this case, FIEs and private-owned firms, are important for addressing different types of workers’
demands. That is to say, for the FIEs, as compared to the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises,
the risk of the wage theft would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.564. For the privateowned firms, as compared to the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprise, the risk of the wage theft
would be expected to increase by a factor of 5.910. From Table 9, 74.75% of the wage theft
occurred in private-owned firms, and only 9.19% wage theft in the FIEs, which is lower than wage
theft in the Hong Kong / Macau /Taiwan-owned enterprises. Therefore, the wage theft relative to
working conditions were likely to happen in the private-owned firms, but such disputes were less
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likely to happen in the FIEs and firms funded by entrepreneurs from HK/Macao/Taiwan, given the
manufacturing economic conditions are held constant.
Table 8
DV: Employee Demands in Manufacturing Sector (2011-17)
Y4: Working Conditions (Base outcome)
Y1: Severance Pay
Y2: Wage theft
Y3: others
Coef. (z) RRR
Coef. (z) RRR
Coef. (z) RRR
IV1
PMI1>=50

0.479*
(2.21)

1.615

0.784***
(3.98)

2.190

0.698**
(2.65)

2.010

-0.138
(-0.82)

0.871

-0.344*
(-2.25)

0.709

-0.217
(-0.99)

0.805

-0.147
(-0.70)
0.142
(0.65)

0.863

-0.572**
(-2.83)
1.777***
(9.04)

0.564

0.319
(1.00)
0.818*
(2.57)

1.376

0.492
(1.69)
0
(.)

1.636

0.522
(1.89)
0
(.)

1.686

1.793***
(4.92)
0
(.)

6.009

0.134
1.143
(0.39)
0
(.)
N
2,389
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.490
(1.55)
0
(.)

1.633

-1.625***
(-3.51)
0
(.)

0.197

IV2
PMI2>=50
IV3
FIEs
Private-owned
firms
SOEs
HK/Macao/Taiwanowned enterprises
(base)
_cons

1.153

5.910

2.267

Table 9
Severance Pay
Enterprise Type
FIEs
Hong Kong / Macau / Taiwan-owned
Enterprises
Private-owned Enterprise
SOEs
Total

Freq.
143
96

Percent
32.06
21.52

Cum.
32.06
53.59

143
64
446

32.06
14.35
100

85.65
100
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Wage Theft
Enterprise Type
FIEs
Hong Kong / Macau / Taiwan-owned
Enterprises
Private-owned Enterprise
SOEs
Total
Working Conditions
Enterprise Type
FIEs
Hong Kong / Macau / Taiwan-owned
Enterprises
Private-owned Enterprise
SOEs
Total

Freq.
139
143

Percent
9.19
9.45

Cum.
9.19
18.64

1,131
100
1,513

74.75
6.61
100

93.39
100

Freq.
104
60

Percent
39.69
22.9

Cum.
39.69
62.6

74
24
262

28.24
9.16
100

90.84
100

From the analysis above, the results show that more than 78% of disputes were about wages,
but from 2011 to 2017 less than 10% of disputes were about wage increases. This is different than
it was in the 1970s in the United States and Germany; back then, almost all workers’ demands
were about wage change. Further, Table 7(2) shows that the number of workers involved in
disputes are significantly lower; for example, less than 5% of disputes involved more than 1,000
workers. The number of workers involved in disputes was significantly lower because wildcat
strikes were hard to organize without assistant from a trade union. From Figure 4 below, wage
theft disputes were significantly higher when less than 100 workers were involved.
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Figure 4: Workers' Demands (2011-17)
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According to the cases, since 2014, many manufacturing factories have relocated or moved
to other places/countries. The capital-intensive manufacturing, such as the Foxconn, had a plan to
reduce orders in China, while the labor-intensive manufacturing moved to inland China and/or
other cheaper labor countries, such as Vietnam. In most cases, workers do not have bargaining
power and they could not threaten the employers to bargain with them on such issues, therefore,
workers made pressures on the government by protests, blocked roads, and sit-downs. That is why
there are 71.6% industrial activities that involve arrests and the police. From Figure 5, the trend of
severance pay disputes will occur periodically as a result of plant relocations and closings.
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Figure 5: Severance Pay Disputes (2011-17)
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Wage theft largely occurred in the routine manual jobs, especially in construction and
manufacturing (Figure 6), and the prior study shows that the number of migrant workers (over 280
million in 2015) makes up over a quarter of all of the working age population. Most of the migrant
workers worked in the construction and manufacturing industries. A unique phenomenon “Sanhe
Dashen” (三和大神) occurred in contemporary China. The “Sanhe Dashen” refers to the younger
generation workers who work one day and then rest for the other days in the week. The younger
generation workers are low-skilled migrant workers, who have minimal education (either
graduated high school or high school drop-outs) and who cannot obtain the vocational skill training
required by companies. The shortage of workforce occurred because the labor supply and demand
has been confronted with two dilemmas: 1) low-skilled/no-skilled workers who are between the
ages of 16-29 who do not have basic vocational training, and therefore, they cannot satisfy the big
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size companies’ recruiting requirements; 209 and 2) some of the young generation migrants do not
want to work full-time jobs in the construction and manufacturing industries; this is because they
do not want the intensive jobs with wage theft and/or low wage. 210 Therefore, they prefer to work
as temporary daily workers instead of full-time workers.211
Figure 6: Wage Theft Disputes (2011-17)
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Moreover, most wage theft disputes were in the construction sector of private-owned firms.
Normally, there are two ways to contract with construction workers: 1) a company provides a task
to a

construction

company,

the

construction company will

find

an independent

contractor/employee lease company, and then the independent contractor/employee lease company
will assign the task to his workers; or 2) the company will provide a task with an independent
contractor, and the independent contractor will assign the work to his workers. These wage theft

209

J.P. Morgan, SKILLS SHORTAGES IN THE CHINESE LABOR MARKET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-Responsibility/document/skillsgap-in-chineselabor-marketexec-summary.pdf, at 17.
210
NHK, 纪录片《三和人才市场：中国日结 1500 日元的年轻人们》[Documentary "Sanhe Labor Market:
Young People with 1,500 Yen in China"], www.nhk.or.jp/docudocu/program/92409/2409304/.
211
Id.
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strikes occur when one of the parties does not pay the workers’ wages. The construction workers,
as opposed to workers in the manufacturing sector, usually faced with wage theft, and the
construction workers hardly ever ask for working conditions changes/severance payments because
of the complexity of employment in the construction sector. (Figure 7 and 8) The trend of wage
theft has dropped because the government emphasized that wage theft was prohibited, and the
government issued policies regarding wage theft issues. Therefore, some cases were solved by the
local labor mediation institution center. The local labor mediation institution center was
established in Guangzhou, Guangdong. The mediators are selected from the local Federation of
Trade Unions, the local business association, and the local labor disputes arbitration committee.
The mediator discusses a labor dispute with the workers and the employer separately. In wage theft
cases, the mediators address two aspects. First, the mediators emphasize that wage theft is illegal,
and the mediators discuss the relative laws and regulations of wage theft. In addition, the mediators
mention sanctions. Second, the mediators comfort the workers’ anxiousness and persuade them
not to block roads. 212 Under such situation, wage theft demands have a possibility to be weaker as
a result of the establishment of the local labor mediation institution centers. Moreover, the local
labor administrative agency will not collect employees’ social insurance any more. The taxation
reform plan indicated that the Tax Bureau will collect social insurance beginning in the year 2019.

Guangzhoushi 2017 Laodong Renshi Zhengyi Tiaojie Anli (广州市 2017 年度劳动人事争议调解“十大案
例”), 广州市人力资源和社会保障局 [Guangzhou Human Resources and Social Security Bureau],
http://www.hrssgz.gov.cn/zwxxgk/zwdt/201808/t20180802_279834.html.
212
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Figure 7: Workers' Demands (Manuafacturing Sector 2011-17)
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Figure 8: Workers' Demands (Construction Sector 2011-17)
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Besides the wage theft in the private-owned firms of construction sector, the other large
portion of wage theft occurred in the manufacturing sector, and these strikes have increased since
the year of 2011. (Figure 7) Among these disputes, the disputes relate to unpaid social security
insurance and wage arrears. In the Yue Yuen Shoes Manufacturing (a Taiwan-owned enterprise,
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Dongguan, Guangdong) strike case, the strikers asked for unpaid partial social security benefits in
2014 with the assistance of the Shenzhen Chunfeng Labor Dispute Service Department (an
authorized non-profit organization). In the manufacturing industry, most workers have worked at
least five years, and most of those workers were born in the 1970s. The work stoppage involved
40,000 workers and lasted for twelve days. The workers’ social security benefits payments should
be paid based on a nominal wage per month, but most companies actually follow the minimum
standard from the local labor security department. As for Yue Yuen manufacturing, the social
security benefits standard is based on the minimum standard. In order to reduce the labor costs in
companies, most companies do not pay employees social security payment based on their nominal
wages. During the work stoppage period, the company argued that they would like to pay back the
unpaid social security benefits, but the local social security institution refused because the
institution was afraid of other companies would do the same. On the other hand, the workers
blocked the roads because they wanted a better response. The Yue Yuen company agreed to some
of the workers’ demands, and in the end, the workers went back to work.
According to Figure 9 below, the working condition demands in the manufacturing sector
increased during the years 2012 to 2014. Workers normally asked for better payment and shorter
work times. In a capital-intensive industry, employers developed technology to reduce workers’
time to save labor costs. Workers asked for increased work time because they would get more
wages. As for the employer, there is no need to increase workers’ work time because the number
of orders has declined. Further, the working conditions strikes have begun to drop at the end of
2014.
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Figure 9: Working Condtitions Demands (2011-17)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011

2012
Construction

2013

2014

Manufactruing

2015
service

2016

2017

transportation

There are two famous working conditions demands cases in the manufacturing sector. First,
the most famous economic wildcat strike is the Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing strike (2011).
The Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing Company is a foreign-owned enterprise in Guangdong,
China. The workers requested better wages. Honda workers made up two thirds of the formal
workers and one third of the trainers, and most workers were around 22 years old and they lived
in the cities. Workers were unsatisfied with wage gaps between Japanese workers and Chinese
workers, and the workers wanted to build a wage negotiation system and reelect the grassroots
trade unions. The work stoppage started on May 17, 2010, and it covered 1,800 workers and it
lasted for nineteen days. During the work stoppage, the company promised to give workers a
response by May 21. On May 21, the negotiations between the workers and the employer’s
representative began. The company agreed to pay 355 yuan ($52 USD) per month which was more
than before, however, workers were not satisfied with the result. After the nineteen days’ work
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stoppage, there was finally a new agreement and the wage was increased to 500 yuan ($73.5 USD)
per month; also, the wage negotiation system was established. 213
Second, the economic wildcat strike in Foxconn, a Taiwan-owned company located in
many cities in China. Workers’ claims have changed from wage increases in the year of 2010 to
working time reduction in the year 2014. This change occurred because of the manufacturing
orders decline. Most of the migrant workers are around 24 years old, and they work in the factory
for around 1.7 years. 214 Many wildcat strikes involve disorderly industrial actions, such as
blocking roads, threatening to jump off buildings, and other violent actions. However, these
wildcat strikes last for short periods of time – normally one or two days. Wages increased in most
plants during the period of 2010-2013.215 Based on the table below, disordered industrial activities
cause more workday loses and negatively impact profitability and orders. The more the strikers
lack experience, the more like the inexperienced strikers will use serious and severe actions, such
as blocking roads. In these strikes cases, workers prefer to choose strikes when the cost of strikes
is diminished.
Table 10: Workers’ Demands
Yue Yuen
Unpaid social security
insurance (2014)

Foxconn
Wage increase
(2010)
Increase work
hours (2014)

Honda
Wage increase (2011)

Workday Lost
Profit Loss
during Strikes

12 days
27 million USD

One or two days
N/A

19days
2.4billion USD

Worker Age

formal workers

younger migrant
workers

younger citizen
workers/trainers

Workers’
Demands

2010 South China Sea Honda Strike (2010 南海本田罷工), http://www.eventsinfocus.org/issues/355.
Pan Yi & Lu Huilin (潘毅, 卢晖临), Foxconn Zhangxin de Beihou 2012 Niandu “Liang an Sandi” Gaoxiao
Diaoyan Baogao (富士康涨薪的背后 2012 年度 “两岸三地” 高校富士康调研报告之二), China Worker 8 (中国
工人 8) (2012): 010.
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See supra note 180, at 20-22.
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Serve Years

more than 10 years

1.7 years

N/A

IV. Recommendations for Lessening Industrial Actions in China
According to chapter three, wage theft disputes frequently occur in the private-owned firms
of construction and manufacturing sectors. Workers were more likely to choose to block roads and
sit-down; thus, the government was more likely to get the police involved and to arrest workers.
In the manufacturing sector, the wage theft disputes occurred more frequently in the private-owned
firms and in the HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises, and the wage theft disputes were the least
likely to occur in the FIEs. The wage theft disputes also increase when the large firms were
expanding. Wage theft disputes increased through the years of 2011 to 2014, however, wage theft
disputes were weaker than before because the cost of wage theft demands increased as a result of
it becoming more difficult for NGOs to instruct and organize workers.as Also, the local mediation
committee centers were set up to solve the wage theft issues.
Most working conditions disputes involved disputes over wage increase rather than
disputes over the working hours. The working conditions disputes frequently occurred in the
manufacturing sector, especially in FIEs, and then in private-owned firms and HK/Macao/Taiwanowned enterprises. Workers usually used protests instead of blocking roads and sit-downs, thus
government responses were mediation or negotiation. Working conditions demands increased
through the years 2011 to 2015, but these demands have declined since 2015 because the number
of orders decreased.
Severance pay disputes frequently occurred in the manufacturing sector, especially in FIEs
and private-owned firms, and then in HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises. The workers’ protest
strikes did not put pressure on their employers as much as working conditions demands because
their factories were closed down and relocated to other places. After workers failed to talk with
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their employers, they usually protested to the local government or they chose to block roads and
sit-in. As a result, local governments were more likely to use police power. Severance pay disputes
increased through the years 2011 to 2015 because of relocation and closings, however, such
disputes have decreased since 2016. Therefore, it is important to note that in the manufacturing
sector, severance pay demands were about layoffs because of two reasons: relocation/closures and
subcontracting. In this chapter, the discussion focuses on how to lessen working conditions strikes
and severance pay strikes in the manufacturing sector.
Workers’ awareness has improved in regard to wage change and statutory severance pay.
However, an employer is reluctant to bargain with the employees’ representative in many cases
when workers are requesting pay increases. Under such conditions, strikes are the economic
weapons to enforce an employer to bargain with the workers’ representative. As the work stoppage
continues, the employer gradually realizes the pressures from workers. However, when an
employer wants to relocate or close his operation, strikes cannot force the employer to bargain
with his employees. On the contrary, such strikes would accelerate the relocation or closure.
Similarly, in subcontracting and new “successor” cases, strikes would accelerate the employer’s
decision to replace strikers.

1.1 Exchange of Information

According to the dataset, many strikes occurred because the labor and the management
could not efficiently exchange information. As for the working condition strikes, the request for
information occurs when a company claims they are unable to increase wages. There is an issue
with the exchange of information when the company does not furnish the appropriate financial
documents. As for the severance pay strikes, the issue with exchanging information occurs in two
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situations: 1) when no notice about the closure is provided to the union/employees’ representatives;
and 2) when the union/employees’ representative could not get relevant information about posttermination expenses.
Article 32 of the Chinese Collective Contract Provision imposes that the other party shall
give a written reply within 20 days from the day it receives the bargaining request and shall not
refuse to collectively negotiate without justifiable reasons. Even though the law says so, the
company often finds an excuse for why it was not profitable so that it would not have to increase
pay.
As for the workers, they prefer to express their feelings rather than describe their demands
and claims. However, it is difficult for an unexperienced and/or powerless grassroots trade
unions/work congress representative to get the company’s financial documents. In fact, a workers’
representative could not successfully argue at the bargaining table with the employer on wage
change without full disclosure of all information. Article 25 of the Chinese Labor Collective
Contract Provision states that the parties’ representatives shall disclose information about
collective bargaining, and furthermore, Article 26 emphasizes that the representatives shall keep
confidential the commercial secrets of the employing entity that they learn of in the course of
collective negotiation. The provision imposes a duty on employers to disclose information that is
relative to collective bargaining, but this provision did not clarify that refusal to furnish
information is an unfair labor practice.
The legal issue here is what kinds of information shall be furnished at the bargaining table.
The United States has addressed similar wage change cases; for example, in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co.,216 the Supreme Court held that a refusal to attempt to prove inability to pay increase could
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give rise to a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith. In NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co.,217 the
Supreme Court emphasized the difference between discovery-type standard of relevancy and the
merits of claims. The Board focuses on discovery-type standard instead of the merits of contractual
issues, so that the union could not be forced into the grievance procedure without evaluating the
merits of claims. A union may get such information from their members, but it is very hard if the
bargaining unit is large. Thus, in these wage change cases, the employer shall provide financial
documents related to wage and collective bargaining.
The essential issue is the subjects of bargaining. In China, Article 8 of the Chinese
Collective Contract Provisions (2004) points out that the contents that may be included in a
collective bargaining contract. The contents include remuneration, working time, rest and
vacations, safety and health, insurance and welfare, training, protections for female and minors,
management of collective contracts, layoffs, discipline, the term of collective contract, procedures
related to collective contracts’ modification and termination, the grievance procedure, duties for
breach a collective contract, and other matters agreed by both parties. These subjects are explained
in detail in Articles 9 to 18.
Article 41 of the Employment Contract Law says that if the employer needs to lay off more
than twenty employees or less than twenty but more than 10% of the total amount of the employees,
the employer shall give notice to the trade union or to all its employees thirty days in advance.
After the employer receives opinions form the union or the employees, it may lay off the specified
number of employees upon reporting the reduction plan to the labor administrative department.
The law lists four situations under Article 41 of when the employer needs to lay off its employees:
1) the operation is under revitalization in the light of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law; 2) the
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operation encounters serious difficulties in production and business; 3) after the firm made
business decisions about its products, technological renovation, or business plan, the employer
may still need to lay off a number of employees based on the new labor contract; and 4) due to
economic difficulties, the current labor contract was changed considerably and the employer was
unable to perform the current contract. However, under such economic layoffs situations, certain
employees shall have a priority to be kept in position or shall be notified if the employer intends
to hire new employees within six months; those employees include: 1) those who have served in
the firm for a long time with a fixed-term labor contract; 2) those who have a non-fixed-term labor
contract; 3) those whose family has no other workforce; and 4) those who have to take care of
seniors or minors in his family.
After the operation’s layoffs, the employer shall pay a severance fee in the light of Article
46 of the Employment Contract Law. The calculation of statutory severance pay is regulated in
Article 47. Article 47 says that,
An employee shall be given severance pay based on the number of years he
has worked for the employer and at the rate of one month's wage for each full
year he worked. Workers who severed in a firm for a period more than six
months but less than one year shall be paid one year wages as their severance
pay. Workers severed in a firm for a period that less than six months shall be
paid half month wages as their severance pay. If the monthly wage of an
employee is three times higher than the average monthly wage of employees
declared by the people's government at the level of municipality directly
under the central government or at the level of a districted city where the
employer is located, the rate for the severance pay shall be three times the
average monthly wage of employees and shall be paid no more than 12 years.
The term of “monthly wage” mentioned in this Article refers to the
employee's average monthly wage for the 12 months prior to the dissolution
or termination of his labor contract.
86

In light of the Employment Contract Law and the Collective Labor Contract Provision,
severance pay is statutorily calculated and a layoff issue due to labor costs should be a mandatory
subject of bargaining in a collective bargaining contract. The ambiguous scope of mandatory
subjects of bargaining will result in difficulties to require good faith bargaining and difficulties to
manage the exchange of information. This is different than the United States labor laws because
the subjects mentioned above are not mandatory subjects of bargaining in Chinese Labor Laws
system. Moreover, if these subjects do become mandatory, what is the boundary line of bargaining
subjects and must the employer bargain with a union about every matter that might have an impact
on its employees?
In United States, the NLRA explains the process for exchanging information during
collective bargaining. The NLRA requires that both the employers and the trade unions bargain in
good faith. As for the employers, they shall bargain in good faith with their employees’
representative and shall sign the collective bargaining agreement that has been reached. Section
8(d) of the NLRA says that both employers and unions have the mutual obligation to bargain
collectively at reasonable times and intervals, and they have an obligation to bargain in good faith
in regard to mandatory subjects of bargaining. Section 8(d) also discusses the issue of bargaining
in bad-faith, which is also called surface or piecemeal bargaining.
The subjects of collective bargaining agreements are divided into mandatory subjects,
permissive subjects, and illegal subjects. The subjects that directly impact wages, hours and
working conditions, and terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. In Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, there is a duty of an employer and the representative
of the employees to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Within these scopes, neither party could yield the duty. In the United
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States, the NLRB and the courts clarified the duty to disclose information in many cases. The
Supreme Court held that “the duty to bargaining collectively includes a duty to provide relevant
information requested by a union for the proper performance of its duties as the employees’
bargaining representative.” 218 The information requested by the union shall be relevant and
legitimate to the union’s duties and responsibilities as a bargaining agent. 219 Concerning the
information relevance, the Federal Court held that “the information should be relevant if it is
material help in examining strategies that may be open to the union as a part of its effort to
minimize the negative effects of the business decision on employees within the bargaining unit”. 220
The test for relevancy was based on the nature of information sought by the union in different
cases. Based on the nature of information, if the requested information was indirectly related to
the terms and conditions of employment, the union has a burden to testify the relevancy in order
to implement its statutory duties. 221 If the requested information was about wages or wage-related
information of the employees in the bargaining unit, the information is presumptively deemed to
be relevant to bargain issues,222 and as for the employer, he must either disprove relevance or
explain the reason that they cannot furnish the information. 223 Further, in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB,224 the Supreme Court clarified that contracting out an employer’s work
is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Supreme Court determined that contracting out work is
a matter within the conditions of employment within Section 8(d) of the NLRA, even if it is for
economic reasons. It is also a mandatory subject because such work was previously performed by
employees in the bargaining unit, and the employees should be able to continue to perform.
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The permissive subjects are not directly related to the work, but these subjects are related
to the nature and direction of the company or to the internal union affairs. For permissive subjects,
either party may choose whether or not to bargain over these matters, and it is ultimately up to the
parties to decide whether or not to agree to include them in the collective bargaining agreement.
In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Wagner Corp., 225 an employer refused to sign a collective
bargaining contract because the contract did not include the employer’s last offer related to a ballot
clause. The ballot clause was not a mandatory bargaining clause. Therefore, the Board and the
Supreme Court held that an employer is not bargaining in good faith if it refuses to enter into an
agreement based on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining.
Another important issue here is how to draw a line between a mandatory subject of
bargaining and a management decision. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 226 the
employer gave notice and then terminated a contract with a Brooklyn nursing center because it
was losing money, but the employer did not notify the union or bargain with the union over the
termination of the contract. The Supreme Court held that the employer had no duty to bargain over
its management decision, although the termination would indirectly affect employees in the
bargaining unit. These business decisions include advertising, product design and type, and
financing arrangements. The test for determining whether a decision is a business decision requires
a determination of whether the substantial impact of the continued availability of employment (and
its benefits for the employment and collective bargaining process) outweigh the burdens placed on
the business.227 The Supreme Court explained that a union has a right to bargain over the effects
of a partial closing, and the anti-union animus closing motivation of an employer violates Section
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8(a)(3) of the NLRA. The management decision cases can be divided into two categories: 1) the
employer shall confer with the union to seek concessions that may continue business profitability
if the labor costs are essential factor in a closing operation; and 2) management decisions that are
labeled as mandatory subjects of bargaining, which give the union a powerful weapon to interfere
with and delay the employer’s opportunities at other times. 228
In NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., the employer planned to move the operation
to another place. The Court of Appeals held that an employer has no duty to bargain with the union
when it moves or consolidates the business due to economic necessity. However, the employer
still has a duty to notify the union so that the union could bargain over relevant issues for the
employees whose employment status will be changed. For example, the issues above include
severance pay, seniority, and pensions. 229 In these cases, the union’s economic weapon to delay
the employer from relocation is normally useless, and a strike can even make the employer
accelerate the closing process. 230 In Brockway Motor Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB,231
the Court of Appeals held that although the union was unable to bargain over the employer’s
business decision to close the company, the union is still able to dissuade the employer from
closing by convincing the employer that such closure could cost more based on post-termination
expenses, such as severance pay. The union could even attempt to advice the employer to wait to
close by discussing timing and implementation issues, which could ultimately decrease the impact
on the employees. Though, this will be difficult when low skilled bargainers are involved in the
bargaining process.
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Another situation arises when workers have demands and they want to bargain while there
is an existing collective bargaining contract. In the United States, the NLRA, more specifically
Section 8(d), does not impose a duty that would require either party to discuss, modify, or terminate
an existing collective bargaining contract, unless the party is seeking such modification or
termination in certain situations. This rule is based on various viewpoints, including a policy on
contract stability demands, a policy consideration of industrial peace, and a compromise view
precluding midterm bargaining over issues that were discussed at the bargaining table. 232 The
parties may waive their right to bargain during the term of collective bargaining agreement through
a “zipper clause.” However, a general zipper clause is not being allowed, the Board held that a
zipper clause will be effective if the clause expressly waives particular subjects in clear and
unmistakable language. 233
Moreover, modification or termination of a collective bargaining contract may be raised
by an employer due to relocation or closure. The dilemma for the employer is that the union will
probably refuse to bargain over the clauses of the existing contract in the light of Section 8(d),
even if the employer offers to bargain. Therefore, the Board reversed its decision on such cases.
In Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers, Local One v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the Supreme
Court held that an employer will violate Section 8(a)(5) only if an employer unilaterally modifies
a mandatory subject of bargaining in a mid-term collective bargaining agreement. 234
The obligation to bargain collectively is under Section 8(d) of the NLRA, and if either
party fails to do, they are subject to unfair labor practices under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). Thus,
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the unfair labor practices by one party will cause the party to lose its protected status; for example,
if a strike occurred within a cooling-off period, the employer can discharge their employees
without against Section 8(a)(3). In the next chapter, unfair labor practices will be discussed in more
detail from the employer and the union sides.

1.2 Unfair Labor Practices

According to the explanations above, in the United States both the employer and union
must bargain in good faith concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining at reasonable times and
reasonable intervals. Further, both parties who engage in bad faith, surface, or piecemeal
bargaining will be subject to unfair labor practices. Before the bargaining process begins, the
parties should exchange the relevant information that the opposing side has requested.
If an employer does not follow Section 8(d), the employer is subject to unfair labor
practices according to Section 8(a)(5). The employer may not make any changes in wages, hours,
working conditions, or other mandatory bargaining subjects without bargaining with the union,
unless one of the following situations occurs: 1) the union prevents the parties from reaching an
agreement or impasse; 2) economic exigencies; or 3) the employer gives the union notice and a
chance to bargain over the matter that is related to a discrete, recurring event in the process of
bargaining, such as an annual merit-wage review. The employer may not implement a wage
proposal concerning the employer’s unlimited discretion over the merit pay increase after impasse.
However, the employer could implement a merit pay proposal post impasse as long as the proposal
defines “merit with objective procedures and criteria” governing pay increase. 235
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The employer also may not do the following: First, it may not refuse to exchange
information or unreasonably delay in furnishing information, if the union requests the information
concerning the bargaining subjects or the employment conditions and terms. Second, it may not
modify any term in a collective bargaining contract without the union’s consent, or unilateral
changes in terms in the period of a collective bargaining contract unless the union has clearly
waived the rights to bargain over the subjects or the changes are deemed to be too minor to require
bargaining by the NLRB. Third, it may not refuse to bargain over issues that have impacts on the
employment relationship based on the company’s business decisions. Based on the analysis above,
the scope of bargaining subjects in a collective agreement is a legal issue in most cases, but simply
subcontracting the same work to another group of workers can be bargained over these changes.
Fourth, it may not refuse to recognized and bargain with a unionized operation while the employer
is a “perfectly clear” Burns successor employer whose business retain all of the predecessor’s
employees in the unit or at least the union’s exclusive majority status will keep in his business
operation. The Supreme Court clarified the Board’s successorship doctrine in NLRB v. Burns
Security Service by holding that a successor is not subject to the substantive terms of a prior
collective bargaining contract settled by the predecessor, and the successor is free to unilaterally
set initial terms of employment unless the successor is a “perfectly clear” Burns successor. 236
Moreover, if an employer acquires the business from the predecessor and then discriminates
against the predecessor’s employees to avoid becoming a Burns successor, the employer cannot
refuse to recognize and bargain with the existed union and cannot set initial terms and conditions
of employment unilaterally without bargaining with the union. Fifth, it may not avoid a bargaining
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duty in a collective bargaining contract by transferring the business operation to a nominally
different business entity to conceal former unionized business. Sixth, it may not insist to impasse
on a bargaining proposal concerning permissive or illegal subjects, such as internal union affairs
and a bargaining representative selection, or discharge employees for union activities. Seventh, it
may not modify or terminate a collective bargaining contract without a written notice to the union
at least sixty days before the expiration of the contract, and modify or terminate a collective
bargaining contract without giving a notice to the federal and state mediators within thirty days of
serving written notice on the union. Last, it may not modify or terminate a collective bargaining
agreement without offering to meet and bargain with a new or modified agreement.237
As for a U.S. union, Section 8(d) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA says that a union must bargain
in good faith, and it is an unfair labor practice if the union fails to do so. Conclusively, from the
above analysis, the union may not do the following: first, it may not insist to impasse on illegal
and permissive subjects of bargaining. Second, it may not further bargain on an existing agreement
on a permissive subject unless the parties mutually agree to do so. Third, it may not refuse to sign
a written collective bargaining agreement that has been reached with the employer. Fourth, it may
not terminate or modify a collective bargaining agreement without notice on the employer at least
sixty days before the contract expires, and if an agreement contract contains no expiration date,
the union should sever a written notice sixty days prior to the date that the union proposed to make
the termination or modification. The union also may not terminate or modify a collective
bargaining agreement without notifying the federal mediation service and state mediation agencies
within thirty days after serving the notice on the employer that the union is terminating or
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modifying the agreement. Further, the union may not terminate or modify a collective bargaining
contract without offering to meet and bargain a new or modified agreement. Fifth, they may not
engage in a strike putting pressure on the employer to modify a mid-term agreement. A union may
not engage in an economic strike before sixty days have passed after the union served a written
notice on the employer about its termination or modification of the agreement, otherwise it will
put strikers in a vulnerable position as they may be discharged. A union may not engage in an
economic strike, if the union is the initiating party of the termination or modification and if the
union failed to give notice to the federal and state mediation institutions within thirty days of
serving written notice on the employer. Otherwise, the strikers will lose their status as employees
of the employer. 238

1.3 Remedies for Refusal to Bargain

In contemporary China, the Trade Union Law regulates unfair labor practices in relation to
the refusal to bargain. Article 53 of the Trade Union Law (2009) says that the party who refused
to bargain without justified reasons shall get a correction order from the people’s governments at
the county level or the level above county. The issue is that the government lacks adequate
remedies for when an employer refuses to bargain.
This was also a problem for the NLRB in the United States before the year of 2000. In
some cases, even though the Board issued a cease and desist order, the employer would not comply
with the decision because the employer realized that he would save more money on litigation fees
if he ignored the union. In addition, as time passes, the employees will lose their confidence and
interests. In such situation, the Board cannot compel either party to compromise on any substantive
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clauses in a collective bargaining agreement. According to H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,239 the Board
compelled the employer to add a clause with respect to the checkoff of union dues in the collective
bargaining agreement when the employer refused to bargain about the checkoff. The Supreme
Court held that the Board has theauthority to encourage and require the employer and union to
bargain, however, with respect to the fundamental policy of the freedom to contract, the Board
does not have the authority to compel either party to make a concession of any substantive
provision of the agreement.
The Board should seek enforcement in the court of appeal, which will take several years.
That is to say, the Board has an authority to seek injunctive relief in the federal courts under Section
10(j) of the NLRA. Besides seeking injunction relief in federal courts, the Board’s power is limited
in the area of the “make whole” remedy, and the Board cannot issue punitive remedies if there is
a refusal to bargaining. 240 Section 10(c) of the NLRA says that,
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be
of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board
shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served
on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That where an
order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be
required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the discrimination suffered by him…Such order may
further require such person to make reports from time to time
239
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showing the extent to which it has complied with the order…No
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual
as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended
or discharged for cause.

Section 10(c) points out that the Board has the authority to issue a cease and desist order
for refusal to bargain, and the Board has the power to issue extraordinary remedies under certain
conditions. Before the Gimrock International case, the remedy for refusal to bargain in good faith
was limited to issuing an order to bargain and posting a notice. Many studies have said that such
remedies were inefficient. 241 In Gimrock International, the Board found that an employer had
failed to bargain in good faith for a first contract for several years, and as a result the Board decided
to impose the enhanced remedy for first contract refusals to bargain cases. 242

During the Obama administration, the General Counsel requested for extraordinary
remedies for instances in which the employer participated in unfair labor practices during
organizing or first contract bargaining. Extraordinary remedies include flagrant violation/recidivist
remedies243 and first contract remedies. In 2007, the General Counsel’s memorandum determined
additional remedies for the bad faith bargaining during the period of the first contract negotiation.
The memorandum indicated that, in the cases where the employer postponed a newly formed
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bargaining relationship, a bargaining order alone will not be sufficient to avoid illegal tactics and
cannot make up for the unlawful costs on the affected party. Therefore, reimbursement of
bargaining costs is important and necessary to fully resist the negative effects of the violations on
employees’ ability to reach a contract. 244 Reimbursement of bargaining costs includes employee
negotiation committee members’ lost wages and union agents’ incomes, meals, mileage, and
lodging expenses as bargaining representatives. 245 That is to say, the remedy with respect to first
contract cases should focus on the effects of bargaining relationship and the need for a true makewhole remedy.

Consequently, as for contemporary China, the Chinese Labor and Employment Laws have
imposed the requirement to exchange information and unfair labor practices for the refusal to
bargain on both parties in a collective negotiation, the issues that still need to be addressed are as
follows: First, based on empirical studies, the labor laws should clarify the mandatory subjects and
the permissive subjects of bargaining. The mandatory subjects of bargaining should be relevant to
the unions’ duties in the process of collective bargaining, and the mandatory subjects should
directly impact wages, hours, and working conditions. Although an employer does not need to
bargain with a union/workers’ representative about their management decisions, subcontracting
with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and partial closings due to labor costs
should be added as a mandatory subjects.
Second, even though the refusal to bargain is prohibited under the Trade Union Law,
bargaining in bad faith still occurrs. The unfair labor practices with respect to good faith bargaining
and furnishing information should be clarified in an article of the Collective Contract Provision.
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Third, the authority to issue a bargaining order should be reconsidered, and more remedies are
needed to enhance good faith bargaining. A correction order issued by the local labor
administration is not sufficient to request an employer to bargain in good faith, so additional
remedies ought to be considered. With regard to the efficiency and differences between the nature
of the judiciary and the labor administrative agency, the labor administrative agency should have
its own administrative judge’s docket to settle unfair labor practices cases efficiently. In terms of
labor laws, Chinese courts and labor arbitration committees have authority to issue damage
remedies, such as statutory severance pay and/or punitive damages with respect to labor dispute
cases. However, based on the collective bargaining resolutions system, if an employer refuses to
bargain, the courts do not have authority to issue any damage remedies. The local labor
administrative has the power to issue a correction order to the employer who refuses to bargain.
There are two disadvantages of having a single resolution: First, an employer will resist to bargain
with a union/workers’ representative because the employer does not have to worry about back pay
and reinstatement, or extraordinary remedies. However, the topic of punitive damages need more
discussion regarding interest labor disputes. Second, based on the empirical analysis, workers
normally strike when they ask for improved working conditions. When workers ask for statutory
severance pay and when they claim wage theft, workers use protests and demonstrations more
frequently in public areas in order to draw attention from the local government. Such situations
happen because work stoppages are inefficient, and also because the local government is
responsible for such labor disputes guaranteed in law. In such cases, labor dispute protests turn
into political protests.

1.4 Enforcement of A Collective Bargaining Contract

99

1.4.1 The Grievance Procedure
In China, even though there are formal collective contracts, these contracts cannot be
enforced. Unlike the Chinese collective bargaining contracts, the collective bargaining agreements
in the United States are enforced through the grievance procedure and the no-strike clause. From
Chapter 2, the coverage of collective contracts in China is much higher than the coverage of
collective contracts in the United States and Germany. As a result of incomplete collective labor
dispute resolution systems, the issue of enforcing the collective bargaining contract could not be
discussed.
Article 8 of the Collective Contract Provision explains that either party may collectively
negotiate the grievance procedure with respect to rights disputes. In actual dispute cases, many
collective contracts simply follow the format from Article 55 of the Collective Contract Provision
that contains a procedure to solve rights disputes. The local Human Resources and Social Security
Bureaus (HRSSB) issued a format sample of the employment contract and/or the collective
bargaining contract.
For example, the grievance procedure clause provides that if there is a labor dispute on the
interpretation of the existing collective bargaining contract, employees could follow these next
steps. First, if there is labor dispute between labor and management, employees could ask the
Labor Conciliation Committees that are inside the company to solve the grievance. Second, the
employees can request a written negotiation notice and the employer should answer his employees
within fifteen days. Third, the employer should bargain with their employees within a certain
number of days. Fourth, if both parties fail to compromise with each other and they cannot reach
a consensus, either party could sue in the labor arbitration committee in their jurisdiction within
one year. The enforcement of such contract ensured by the selected monitors from both the
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employer’s representative and the union, and the monitors should make an annual report to the
Workers’ Congress over the implementation of collective contract. This formatted collective
contract gives employees a right to negotiate over any subject (including mandatory subjects and
permissive subjects of bargaining) with their employer during the period of an existing collective
contract. Such clauses will cause a negative impact on the enforcement of collective contracts, and
the above analysis indicates that when one party can bargain with the other during the term of an
existing contract. The general understanding is that one party cannot terminate or modify the terms
of an existing contract; the parties are prohibited from doing this in order to keep industrial peace.
But there is an exception. When there is a successor employer, the successor employer is not
subject to the substantive terms of a prior collective bargaining contract settled by the predecessor,
and the successor is free to unilaterally set initial terms of employment, unless the employer
acquires the business from the predecessor and hires a majority of predecessor’s employees. Then,
the employer shall bargain with the existing grassroots union. Moreover, if an employer takes over
a business from the predecessor to try to avoid a duty to bargain, the employer cannot refuse to
recognize and bargain with the existed grassroots union, and the employer cannot set initial terms
and conditions of employment unilaterally without bargaining with the union. Therefore, such
negotiations in the grievance clause should be deleted unless an issue occur with respect to a
specific successor employer.
In order to solve the grievances fairly and efficiently, the legal issue of who the workers’
representative is must be addressed. This is different than the rights disputes because interest
disputes are non-arbitral. The grassroots union has an authority to represent employees because of
the Labor Laws, which imply that the grassroots trade union can either participate in the triparty
bargaining (or the labor arbitration) or they can offer assistance to employees’ representatives in
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arbitration and litigation. For now, the grassroots trade unions have realized their duty to represent
employees in a negotiation case, and the industrial actions accelerated the grassroots union’s duty
to represent employees in the process of negotiation.
For example, when a worker demands better working conditions, those demands are related
to interests that occur when workers want to create a new collective contract because a contract
did not exist or because there was a formatting problem. Based on the analysis above, the
grassroots unions have gained experience in representing their employees in interest disputes. Also,
the disadvantages of interest dispute resolution systems are the exchange of information, unfair
labor practice and the refusal to bargain, and insufficient remedies for refusal to bargain in good
faith, especially for first contract cases.
However, if there is a rights dispute over the interpretation and application of the existing
collective contract, such disputes should be arbitral in the labor arbitration committee. The
grassroots union is not familiar with its duty to represent employees in negotiation and/or labor
arbitration. It is hard to find a labor arbitration case that is represented by a union; therefore,
individual labor rights arbitration cases keep increasing for several years, according to Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Annual Labor Disputes caseloads
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As for workers’ demands of severance pay, some labor disputes over layoffs and severance
pay were going to the labor arbitration committees as individual employment disputes, but some
cases were hard to pursue in the labor arbitration committees because workers were not yet
discharged at that time. In addition, workers knew that the business operations would partially
close or relocate to another place, or they knew that the employer would subcontract their jobs to
another group of people. Therefore, the grassroots union’s duty to represent employees in rights
disputes should be explicitly clarified in the Collective Contract Provision, and the grievance
procedure clause of the collective bargaining contract shall list the following:
1. Definitions:
1.1

Grievance:
A grievance shall be defined as a written complaint arising out of the interpretation,
application, or alleged violation of this collective contract.

1.2

Days: mean weekdays from the first contracted day…except holidays.
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2. Right to representative:
When there is a labor dispute about the interpretation or application of existing collective
bargaining contract (including warnings recorded in the personnel file, and including
demotions, suspensions, or discharges), a grassroots union can represent the employees if
the employees request to do.
3. Initiation of Grievances
Grievances may be filed by an employee or group of employees, a representative, the
Union, or by the employer. Grievances of a general nature filed by the Union may be
initiated at the second step of the grievance procedure. A sincere effort shall be made to
settle grievances fairly and equitably. However, if the employer or the grassroots union
mutually agrees on settling a dispute by other means other than these described as
following in the grievance procedures without prejudice to their representative duties, such
means cannot be precluded.
4. Grievance Procedure.
4.1

Basic Procedure
a)

Within two weeks after the employee becomes aware or should

become aware of the situation, condition, or action of management giving
rise to a grievance, the employee affected thereby, or the employee’s
Representative, could present a written grievance notice to the Labor
Conciliation Committees inside the company for a settlement.

The

committee shall give an answer within one production period.
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b)

The written notice will indicate the nature of the grievance, the

adjustment requested, and any other related information. Each of the parties
should retain a copy of the grievance.
c)

After a written grievance notice has been submitted, all negotiations

and settlements with respect to this grievance shall be handled through the
designated Union representative.
d)

The committee will give to the worker, or the workers’

representative a written answer within two production periods from the time
the grievance is received. Additional time may be allowed by mutual
agreement of the employees and employer.
e)

If the grievance is not processed in writing to the second step of the

grievance procedure within four production periods from receipt of the
committee’s written answer, the case shall be closed. Additional time may
be allowed by mutual agreement.
4.2

Escalation:
If resolution is not reached by the close of step one, both the grassroots union and
the employer will present their case to their jurisdiction labor arbitration committee
within one year.

1.4.2 The No-Strike Clause
As Chapter Two mentioned, the United States and Germany have “no-strike clauses” to
enforce a collective bargaining agreement, however, there is no such clause in a collective contract
in China. The collective contract enforcement is controlled by a state-policy that is monitored by
the local government, the local trade union, and the employees’ representative.
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Based on industrial actions from the study, the cost of wildcat strikes in China is lower
than strikes in the United States and Germany. As for workers, it is not as difficult for them to be
gathered together to participate in industrial actions, but it is very hard for them to keep gathered
and trust their grassroots union if there is no further progress. Therefore, it is important to clarify
what kinds of demands employees could strike for, and it is important to consider whether or not
to add the no-strike clause doctrine in law.
Generally, the no-strike clause means employees will not initiate any strikes during the life
of the agreement as stated in of the provision in the collective bargaining agreements. However,
employees will not lose their employee status when they participate in an unfair labor practice
strike. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 246 the Supreme Court held that there were no contractual
or statutory provisions baring the employees’ strikes solely against their employer’s unfair labor
practices and the employees will not lose their status as employees in the light of section 8(d) of
the NLRA. Moreover, the striking employees are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.

In order to improve the industrial peace, the strikes shall be classified into economic strikes
and unfair labor strikes due to labor laws. For instance, in the United States, the economic strikers
refer to employees who want to obtain a concession from the employer over improving wages,
shorting work hours, or other better working conditions. Their employee status indicates that they
can be replaced, but they cannot be discharged. When the employer hires bona fide permanent
workers to replace the economic strikers’ jobs while the strikers apply unconditionally to go back
to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement. However, the strikers are entitled to be
recalled to their qualified jobs, when there is an opening for the jobs, if the strikers have made an
unconditional request to reinstatement. The unfair labor practice strikers refer to strikers who
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protest an unfair labor practice conducted by their employer. These strikers cannot be discharged
and cannot be permanently replaced. After an unfair labor practice strike, the strikers without
misconduct are entitled to be reinstated even though other employees were hired to do their jobs
have to be discharged. Under these two different types of strikes, when strikers apply for
unconditional requests to reinstatement and they are unlawfully denied by their employer, the
remedy for the unlawful refusal of reinstatement is back pay at the time that strikers should have
been reinstated.

As for contemporary China, the economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes should
be declared in law. First, generally, employees who are striking for economic factors, such as wage
increases, shorter hours, and other working conditions, within sixty days of notice of proposed
contract termination or modification lose their employee status. Second, if a strike is related to
unfair labor practices rather than termination or modification of an existing contract, the loss-ofstatus provision is not applicable. Third, an employee status refers to employees who are entitled
to get pay back with reinstatement, even if the replacement of them has been made. Fourth, the nostrike clause is implied in a collective contract where the contract does not contain the no-strike
clause. The no-strike clause can also be explicitly stated in the contract which can contain even
more detail. The format of the no-strike clause can be described as follows:
The employer and the union agree that there will be no strike,
lookout, slowdown, sit down, any work stoppages, demonstrations,
or any other concerted industrial actions interference with work of
any kind during the term of the collective contract. If any employee
engages in these industrial actions above, the employer shall
discipline or discharge the employee. Also, the employer agrees that
it will not initiate a lockout during the term of the contract.
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1.5 Collective Bargaining Model

In China, a large number of working conditions demands occurred in the manufacturing
sector, and workers’ demands are classified into pay increase (in most cases) and working time
change. As the paper discussed above, the problems in the Chinese collective bargaining system
are refusals to bargain, hard to furnish information, insufficient remedies for refusals to bargaining
in good faith, and insufficient enforcement of a collective bargaining contract. Together with the
third research question, the result shows that when the small/medium firms’ economy has
expanded, workers’ demands for working conditions increased relative to wage theft, especially
in the year of 2013 and 2014. In the year of 2015 and 2016, the manufacturing sector had a tough
time, workers’ demands for severance pay increased because of operations closed and relocated.
While the large firms’ economy has expanded, workers’ demands for severance pay are relatively
higher than the demands for working conditions for two reasons: 1) a successor employer acquired
the business from the predecessor; and 2) an employer subcontracted the specific part of jobs in a
collective contract by hiring an outside company or provider. When the large firms’ economy has
expanded, workers’ concerns for wage theft were higher compared to asking for improving
working conditions for three reasons: 1) the operation is closed and the employer “runaway”; 2)
wage decreased because of business loss; and 3) a successor employer decreased wage.

Generally, the Chinese collective bargaining is a company-level collective bargaining and
institutionalized tripartite combined system that provides regulations and a framework for
agreements for company-level collective negotiation. The collective agreements can be made at
company-level between the employer and the worker’s representative/grassroots union. The
Collective Contract Provision indicates that the government will not be involved in a company-
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level collective negotiation, but if the negotiation failed, a tripartite negotiation can be requested
by either an employer or employees’ representative/union in the administrative department of labor
and social security or can be organize by the administrative department if it deems necessary. The
tripartite system includes the representative of the employer and the union and the administrative
department of labor. The role of the administrative department is actually neutral in the process of
negotiation.

However, sectoral/regional collective contract also can be concluded in China. The Article
53 of the Labor Contract Law says that

Sectoral or regional collective contracts may be concluded between
the labor unions and the representatives of enterprises in industries
such as construction, mining, catering services, etc. in the regions
at or below the county level.
In practice, a sectoral/regional collective contract is not limited in the regions at or below
the county level, but such contract is rare. For instance, the Shandong Electronics and Machinery
Trade Union and Shandong Electronics and Machinery Association concluded a sector collective
contract in 2006. The Wuhan Catering Collective Contract was concluded by the Wuhan Trade
Union and the Wuhan Catering Association. Conclusively, the Chinese collective bargaining
contract was based on both company-level (in most cases) and sector-level.
The prior research points out that collective bargaining can solve labor conflicts and
disputes in a more socially efficient and productive way. For the United States and Germany, the
decline of collective bargaining coverage resulting from the erosion of unionism is not inevitable,
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however, the decline would be influenced by policy and politics. 247 Union wage premium is one
of the most researchable and important issues in labor economics.
One of the researches explained that unions benefit workers over a monopoly wages and
unions increase the productivity. 248 The single-employer bargaining model, to some degree, could
not be the best choice in the contemporary China labor disputes resolution. Multi-employers
bargaining, which indicates a bargaining model between the employer association and the union,
shall be considered. The nature of a sector-level collective contract is standardizing working
conditions including wages to produce a latent cartelization among employers insofar as they take
wages out of their competition.249 Also, sector-level bargaining facilitates industrial restructuring
and modernization to overcome certain market failures, and the sector-level contract can weaken
management resistance to unionism partially because the union wage premium in a sector-level
bargaining is lower than a firm-level bargaining.250
In the German dual model system, despite a pronounced decline in collective bargaining
coverage since the mid-1990s, the German collective bargaining system still takes up fifty six
percent in the year 2016 because the system provides homogeneous competitive conditions and
keeps industrial peace. 251 The employer associations and unions conclude a sector-level collective
contract on minimum conditions. The sector collective contracts over minimum wages can be
extended in various sectors, such as construction, clean and care working, in terms of the German
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Posted Workers Act. 252 In order to improve the coverage of collective contract, the collective
contract shall be more flexible. Additionally, the labor policies were made to assist employers and
economics adjust to economic shocks in the 2008 financial crisis.
A works agreement can be used to deviate collective standards but need the consent of
social partners, while a collective bargaining contract can leave some self-governed part open for
the works council and management to conclude a works agreement. This works agreement does
not need an approval for social partners. The use of opening clauses made the sector-level
bargaining model decentralized by allowing firms to deviate from the collective standard under
certain situations as follows: First, working time adjustments can be discussed. A working time
adjustment allows the firm to delegate the allocation of working time and overtime at a companylevel. At that time, the government subsidies were paid to the employers to keep extended shorttime working attractive. 253 Second, a wage adjustment can be discussed. Small-sized firms can
conclude an agreement for lower wages (small-sized firms wage adjustments). Moreover, when a
firm has some serious economic problems, the firm can apply for an exemption. After the
exemption is appropriate by social partners, the firm can pay its employees’ wages below the
collective standard within a limited time period. The use of opening clause over wage adjustment
is less frequent when the sector economy is favorable. Third, a bonus adjustment can be discussed.
Overtime wages, annual bonuses and holiday allowance, and other benefits can be reduced,
postponed, or completely cut. 254
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The policies, which allowed companies to pay lower wages to temporary workers, brought
another problem over the distribution inequality gap. Together with the decline of unionism,
reduced bargaining power shall be addressed through polices and labor laws.255 The first federal
minimum wage in Germany was approved in 2014 under the Minimum Wage Act
(Mindestlohngesetz), which means a collective bargaining agreement could set wages that were
no less than the statutory national minimum wage. If the minimum wage of the collective
agreement is less than the statutory minimum wage, the statutory minimum wage has priority. 256
Employers who failed to pay minimum wage will be charged with heavy penalties by the Tax
Enforcement Unite for Undeclared Work (Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit).257 The works councils
and unions monitor wage arrears.
Based on the empirical results, workers’ demands for wage theft occurred more frequently
in private-owned firms of the construction and manufacturing sectors. Demands for working
conditions occurred more frequently in FIEs of the manufacturing sector. Demands for severance
pay occurred more frequently in FIEs and private-owned firms of the manufacturing sector.
Partially because of the downturn of economy, the traditional manufacturing suffered a hard time.

There are more suggestions. First, sector-level bargaining should use a primary resolution
for the traditional manufacturing sector. A sector-level collective bargaining contract can include
mandatory subjects of bargaining with an open clause, and then branches can negotiate some
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specific subjects regarding the opening clause. Second, the nature of the opening clause is to help
companies go through hard times and secure workers’ jobs. The opening clause cannot be used in
a sector-level collective contracts unless a firm suffers serious business loss and both employees’
representative/union and employer have agreed to set the opening clause in the company-level
agreement with a limited time period. Further, the opening clause can be used in a small-sized firm
for wage and benefit negotiations. Third, due to considerations of the public interest, the
government decree can be issued to extend to the sector-level collective contract into the national
level with respect to migrant workers within the minimum standards of wages and other working
conditions in the construction sector. Fourth, the minimum wage in China needs to be discussed
more because the minimum wage will make a significant influence on the employment of lowskilled workers and small-sized firms. More research needs to be done in order to analyze whether
there is a significant impact on the unemployment of low-skilled workers.

V. Conclusion
In this paper, the examination focuses on industrial actions through the year of 2011 to
2017. The results find that three are four main reasons triggering industrial actions: 1) business
closure or relocation; 2) subcontracting works to another provider; 3) a successor employer
changed wages or workers’ employment status; 4) demands for wages increase, working hours,
and other working conditions. In these industrial actions, workers asked for the payment of unpaid
wages, statutory severance pay, and wage increases and/or improvements in other working
conditions.
Wage theft disputes frequently occurred in the private-owned firms of construction and
manufacturing sectors. Wage theft disputes frequently occurred in the construction industry, which
indicates that private-owned firms expanded at the expense of paying workers’ wages. During the
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process of industrial actions, workers easily chose to block roads and sit-down, thus government
officials were more likely to get police involved to make arrests. In the manufacturing sector, wage
theft disputes occurred frequently in the private-owned firms and HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned
enterprises, but less likely to occur in the FIEs. Wage theft disputes occurred frequently in the
manufacturing industry, which indicates that private-owned firms and HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned
enterprises business expanded at the expense of paying worker’s wages and/or social insurances.
Working conditions disputes (most of which revolved around demands for improved wages
rather than other working conditions) frequently occurred in the manufacturing sector, especially
in FIEs, and then in private-owned firms and HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises. This suggests
that the workers were conscious of the companies’ business expansion but that the workers did not
share the fruit to get better pay. In these cases, the workers usually protested in a moderate way
instead of blocking roads and sitting-down, thus government responses were to promote mediation
or encourage negotiation.
Statutory severance pay disputes frequently occurred in the manufacturing industry,
especially in FIEs and private-owned firms, and then in HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned enterprises.
Typically, the company suffered a business loss, while workers were afraid of job loss. Workers’
protest strikes could not put pressures on their employers as much as economic strikes, because
their factories probably closed down and relocated to other places at that time. After workers failed
to talk with their employers, they usually protested to the local government or they chose to block
roads and sit-down. In response, the local governments were more likely to use police power.
The empirical study contributes to five legal issues discussions. First, the most difficult
thing is furnishing information before or in the process of negotiation. Second, whether employer
induces an unfair labor practice if he refuses to bargain. Third, is the remedy for refusal to bargain
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in good faith sufficient and efficient. Fourth, how to enforce a collective bargaining contract. Five,
exploring a better bargaining model in order to encourage industrial peace in the contemporary
China.
From a legal perspective, first, the Labor Law should clarify the mandatory subjects of
bargaining and permissive subjects of bargaining. The mandatory subjects of bargaining should be
relevant to unions’ duties in the collective bargaining, which directly impacts the wages, hours,
and working conditions. Although an employer does not need to bargain with a union/workers’
representative about the management decisions, simply subcontracting with respect to the terms
and conditions of employment should be considered a mandatory subject of bargaining. Partial
closure should be considered as a mandatory subject of bargaining, if the reason for closure is
simply save labor costs.
Second, the Labor Laws should clarify unfair labor practices with respect to good faith
bargaining and the requirement to furnish information. Additionally, the administrative judge
dockets should be established in the labor administrative agency, and the remedies for such refusals
can be enhanced not only through a bargaining order but also through traditional remedies and
extraordinary remedies by the labor administrative agency. Moreover, damage remedies for
refusals to bargain can be enhanced in the courts.
Third, for the collective contracts, the contract is not just a certification of employment
between employees and the employer. Instead, the contract is a legally binding agreement enforced
by the laws. It is very important to explain in more detail the grievance procedure for collective
contracts and how to solve rights disputes. In addition, the grassroots union’s duty to represent
employees in a rights dispute should be explicitly clarified in the labor laws. Furthermore, the no-
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strike clause should be discussed by social partners in a collective contract on the condition that
the economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes are clearly regulated in labor laws.
Fourth, because of the hard times in traditional manufacturing, the best bargaining model
for the traditional manufacturing is the sector-level collective bargaining contract with the opening
clause, and a company-level collective bargaining contract in the light of an opening clause. The
opening clause is only used in two situations. First, if the firms suffered serious business loss
within a limited period of time and the use of the clause requires consent from both the employer
and the employees’ representative/union. Second, if the firms are small-sized firms, they can
negotiate their wages and benefits. Lastly, the extension of sector collective bargaining contracts
in the construction sector for migrant workers can be issued through government decrees.
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